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I. INTRODUCTION
East of Africa and south of Asia lies the third largest
sea in the world the Indian Ocean (10) , covering more than
twenty-eight million square miles. The Indian Ocean is
possibly the least known of the world's major oceans although
its waters wash the shores of some thirty-five independent
nations. One important fact distinguishing the Indian Ocean
from its sister oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific, is the
absence of a major world power along its shores. For this
reason it is often regarded as an area of secondary importance
to these major powers. The focus of this study is on a small
segment of the Indian Ocean, that area called, for want of a
better term, the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) who's geographical
limits have arbitrarily been constructed as extending from
approximately 20° S latitude northward to 5° S latitude and
from the East African coast to 75° E longitude and encompassing
primarily the littoral nations of Mozambique, Madagascar,
Mauritius, The Comoros and The Seychelles.
It has only been since the 1960s that the Department of
Defense began to look in earnest at the strategic possibilities
of the WIO. Previously the islands of the WIO seemed to be
living safely in a distant corner of the world away from super-
power confrontation. Despite all of the turmoil and conflict
taking place in the 20th century the Indian Ocean remained

basically unaffected up until the late 1960s. The British
decision to withdraw its military forces from the area in 196 8
combined with reduced French military presence and economic
austerity programs in the area and the rapid withdrawal of
Portuguese forces in 19 74 resulted in a power vacuum in the
area. Into this new arena rushed the superpowers of the 19 70s:
the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Economic
factors were partly responsible but by 19 75 a race was in
progress between the strategists of the United States and the
Soviet Union to lay claim to the WIO. The Nixon Administration
brought the issue of protection of sealanes into the spotlight
and the Indian Ocean became a prime candidate for an area of
superpower confrontation. The 19 7 3 Arab-Israeli War emphasized
the value of permanent operating bases in the Indian Ocean,
the unreliability of operating from bases in Arab nations,
and the sensitivity of the West about the supply and protection
of shipments of natural resources. [Ref. 1] The WIO '
s
strategic importance for the superpowers is often linked to
its position astride the vital Cape Route and the utilization
of that route by global transport.
The fact that the Western industrial nations are dependent
on overseas sources of energy and raw materials has been
brought home to most of the inhabitants of the West and
increasing attention has been focused on the routes by which
these commodities reach their destinations. It has become
clear that any serious interruption in the flow of these goods

would cause severe economic and in turn political damage to
these nations.
Although the threat to U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean
is of a relatively low magnitude, it is nevertheless an area
that deserves close and continuing attention in view of the
apparent Soviet objective to enlarge their influence and
presence in the region. [Ref. 2]
The purpose of this study is to examine the area of the
Western Indian Ocean from strategic, economic and political
points of view in order to determine what U.S. interests in
the area are and assess our ability to protect those interests
This thesis is divided into three primary sections.
Section one attempts to delineate the United State's interests
in the Western Indian Ocean. It examines both strategic and
economic considerations. Section two provides a country-by-
country survey of the political evolution of the region.
Finally, section three attempts to define U.S. policy objec-
tives for the region and outline the options available for
achieving those objectives. The position taken in this
section is that the U.S. needs to develop a coherent policy
toward the Western Indian Ocean as a region. This policy
should be an affirmative rather than a reactive approach to
the area and its problems. This approach should not single
out a specific country but rather must look at the area in a
regional and global perspective.
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II. U.S. INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN
A. THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN
The vastness of the 10 is shown by the long distances be-
tween points around its shores. [Ref. 3] From Capetown to
Singapore, for example, the distance is 5,579 nautical miles;
from Aden to Australia it is 5,187 nautical miles. A number
of islands are situated along these extended routes. Two-
thirds of the way from Capetown to Singapore lies the island
of Mauritius. Mauritius also is conveniently situated along
the routes from Capetown to Colombo and Bombay. [Ref. 4] The
Comoros are strategically located astride the northern entrance
to the Mozambique Channel while the Seychelles sit along one
of the main inter-ocean routes to Colombo and Singapore as
well as one of the inter -ocean routes to Dar Es Salaam. The
island nation of Madagascar comprises the eastern breakwater
of the strategic Mozambique Channel.
Most of the islands of the WIO are clustered in a wide arc
to the east and northeast of Madagascar. [Ref. 5] The islands
of the 10 have developed in a variety of ways. Madagascar
and part of the Seychelles are granitic islands, detached from
larger land masses. Mauritius and the Comoros are volcanic
islands formed from submarine eruptions. Another type,
including the islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory
(BIOT) developed from the buildup of coral in shallow tropical
waters. [Ref. 6. ]
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Throughout history the islands of the WIO have figured
primarily as counters for the interplay of great-power
imperialism. Their subordination to Europe and disengagement
from Afro-Asia proceeded at different times and with differing
consequences. The fact that these islands are important today,
is not directly linked to any actions by the island's govern-
ments but rather to the strategies of the superpowers in the
WIO. Today U.S. and Soviet vessels can be found in increasing
numbers in the 10 for many different reasons (i.e. show the
flag, fishing, commerce, fleet transfers, etc.). Additionally,
Chinese vessels are frequent visitors to Dar Es Salaam.
England and France are also seeking a return to the area with
increased military presence and West Germany has decided to
follow along although in a somewhat lesser capacity due to
arms limitations. No longer stepping-stones in an empire,
the Comoros, Madagascar, Seychelles and Mauritius have stra-
tegic importance as nations in an increasingly disputed area
of ocean. [Ref. 7]
Also important in the region, however - and critical to
its development - are the airfields. These not only permit
access to and from the outside world, but also are often the
only feasible mode of travel. Large airfields capable of
handling modern jets, and with ample refueling facilities,
exist in many countries in the region and there are numerous
smaller fields. Mainly constructed during the European-
dominated colonial era, these air facilities play a vital
12

security role as well as important economic and political
roles. The strategic value of such African air bases, together
with over-flight, staging or basing rights in African
countries, has been demonstrated by both Western powers and
the Soviet Union seeking to shore up shaky client regimes.
[Ref. 8]
1. Madagascar
The Democratic Republic of Madagascar (formerly called
the Malagasy Republic) comprises the island of Madagascar and
several much smaller islands nearby - Nosy Be, Nosy Mitsio,
lie St. Marie and lies Barren. Madagascar is the fourth
largest island in the world with 5,000 kilometers of shore-
line, and is separated from the African mainland by the
Mozambique Channel with a nominal width of some 400 km. It
is 1,600 km long from north to south and its width varies
between 4 50 and 5 70 km. The whole country covers an area of
587,041 sq km and had an estimated population of 9,112,000
in 19 77. Geologically the island is composed of crystalline
rock. Due to its location Madagascar has remained isolated
from most of the world.
Madagascar's mountainous topography has been a con-
tinuous handicap but the great natural harbor of Antseranana
(formerly Diego - Suarez an important French naval base) is
located in the northern province isolated by the island's
highest peak. Although lacking sheltered anchorages on the
eastern coast Toamasina (Tamatave) is the site of Madagascar's
13

most important commercial port. There are few good natural
harbors in the 10, but Baie de Narinda on the west coast and
Diego Suarez in the north are among the largest and best
natural harbors in the world. Unfortunately Baie de Narinda
is isolated from the country's principal commercial centers
and is still undeveloped while Baie de Diego Suarez was
developed by the French as a naval base. There are 18 ports
with Toamasina handling about two-thirds of the total traffic
while the second largest, Mahajanga, is on the west coast.
Because of the high cost of maintaining rail and road networks
much money and effort is being spent on expanding Madagascar's
air services. Madagascar already has over 200 airfields (2/3
of which are privately held) and three airports can accommodate
large jet aircraft. The international airport Ivato is
located at the capital Antananarivo and is served by Aeroflot,
Air France, Alitalia and Air Tanzania.
Madagascar claims the small offshore islands - Bassas
de India, Europa, Juan de Nova to the west, and Glorieuses
and Tromelin to the east. All of these islands with the
exception of Bassas de India possess a weather station and an
airstrip. The weather stations are manned by the French who
consider the islands French overseas territories in the 10
and administer them out of Reunion.
2 . Mozambique
Mozambique covers an area of 78 3,0 30 sq km of
African territory with an estimated population of 11,750,000
14

in 19 79. Its neighbors are, to the north, Tanzania, to the
west Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and to the south South
Africa and Swaziland. Its shoreline is 2,735 km long and
generally sandy and bordered by lagoons, shoals and strings
of coastal islets in the north. At least 25 main rivers cut
through Mozambique and flow into the 10.
Mozambique's location on the eastern flank of southern
Africa gives to her a position of unique importance. Of all
Africa's "outlet" countries, she is the most strategically
placed: because of her coastline, the quantity and size of
her harbours, and the number of countries whose outlets to
the sea she controls. Mozambique is the natural maritime out-
let for Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, parts of South Africa and
Swaziland. Mozambique's harbours, which are of excellent
quality have been greatly enhanced in importance because of
the inland territories they serve; for some of these territories
they are the only ports that make economic sense. Railways
from these inland countries pass through Mozambique on their
way to its ports and are vital links in the transportation
network for southern Africa.
Mozambique's main ports are Maputo (the second largest
port in Africa, with the annex at Matola), Beira, Nacala and
Quelimane. Maputo is considered the best harbor on the whole
East African coast and serves as the principal outlet for
Swaziland, the Transvaal and Zimbabwe. Twenty-one vessels
can be berthed at any one time and it has special facilities
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for loading coal, a cold storage plant for fruit and a sugar
terminal. Beira is the outlet for Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe
as well as some traffic from Zaire. The most recently developed
port has been Nacala which possesses a large natural harbor
while the railway inland from it serves the northern interior
of Mozambique and Malawi. It will become one of major ports
of East Africa. [Ref. 9]
Air transportation is operated by the state and there
are 16 airports, three of which are international. Mozambique
is served by Aeroflot, Air Tanzania, Interflug (G.D.R.),
Zambia Airways and TAAG (Angola) among others.
Mozambique's geographic location in southern Africa,
bordering as it does on South Africa, also makes it a very
important political actor in southern Africa. Since its inde-
pendence in 19 75, it has been a critical member of the Front-
line States grouping. This is discussed later in greater
detail.
3. The Comoros
Situated like stepping stones the Comoro Islands, an
archipelago of four small islands, together with numerous
islets and coral reefs, lie between the east African coast and
Madagascar. The four islands have a total land area of only
2,2 36 sq km and are scattered along a N.W.-S.E. axis, 300 km
separating the towns of Moroni in the west and Dzaoudzi in
the east. The French names for the islands, Grande-Comore
16

(on which the capital, Moroni, is situated). Anjounan, Moheli
and Mayotte were changed in May 19 77 to Njazidja, Nzwani,
Mwali and Mahore respectively, although the former names are
still widely used.
The composition of the population (estimated at
385,000 in 19 78, including Mayotte) is complex as the islands
were invaded by many ethnically different groups. The dif-
ferent sections of the population are still not fully inte-
grated, but Arab culture is found throughout the Archipelago.
French was the official language until independence in 19 75
at which time the new state returned to Arabic. The majority
of the population, however, speak Comorian, a mixture of
Arabic and Swahili which is written in Arabic script. [Ref. 10]
The transport infrastructure of the Comoros consists of
approximately 750 km of roads serviceable throughout the year:
four ports, only two of which can accommodate medium size
vessels; and an airport on each island. Grand Comores air-
port at Moroni (the capital) was improved to handle large
jets in 19 73. Most of the imports from Europe come via
Madagascar and coasters serve the islands from the east coast
to Africa.
4 . Mauritius
Lying some 804 km east of Madagascar is Mauritius
an island of 1,865 sq km in area. It is volcanic and almost
completely surrounded by a coral reef. Including other
islands, mainly Rodrigues, the whole country has an area of
2,040 sq km and a population of 911,507 (1979 estimate).
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Mauritius is well served by numerous foreign shipping
lines and modernization of the harbor at Port Louis was com-
pleted in 1980. In 1974, 1,217 ships visited Port Louis
compared with 700 a year before the Suez Canal closed in 1967.
Although the Suez Canal reopened in 19 75, the growth in
tourism has stimulated both sea and air travel to Mauritius.
In 19 79, 2,816 aircraft landed, depositing 179,190 passengers.
The airport is at Plaisance although the government is building
a new international airport at Plaines des Roches in the
north of the island with assistance from the People's Republic
of China.
Rodrigues , a volcanic island of 104 sq km surrounded
by a coral reef, 585 km east of Mauritius (19°S., 63°E) , is
an integral part of the state of Mauritius. Its population
in 19 79 was estimated at 29,20 3.
Mauritius has two dependencies (together covering 71
sq. km and having 36 7 inhabitants in 19 72) : Agalega, two
islands 935 km north of Mauritius (10°S., 56°E); and St.
Brandon (or Cargados Carajos Shoals) , 22 islets without perm-
anent inhabitants but used as fishing stations, 370 km north-
northeast of Mauritius (16° S. , 59° E)
.
Mauritius claims sovereignty over Tromlin, a small
island without permanent inhabitants, 556 km to the northwest.
This claim is disputed by France (France has maintained an
airstrip and weather stations on this island since 1959).
Mauritius also seeks the return of Diego Garcia, a coral
18

atoll in the Chagos Archipelago, about 1,900 km to the north-
east. The Archipelago was formerly administered by Mauritius
but in 1965 became part (and in 19 76) all of the British
Indian Ocean territory.
Mauritius lies on the principal shipping lane between
Europe and the Far East for traffic not utilizing the Suez
Canal. Port Louis has the largest ship repair facility on any
of the small Indian Ocean, islands. [Ref. 11]
Petroleum exploration is now underway north of Mauritius
and there is a possibility of bringing in wells on the Cargados
Carajos Shoals; if exploitable petroleum reserves should be
proved, the importance of the outlying islands would increase
dramatically. [Ref. 12]
5. The Seychelles
The Seychelles archipelago consists of a scattered
group of 37 granitic and 52 coralline islands along with
numerous rocks and small cays. When independence was achieved
in June 1976 the Aldabra Islands, the Farquhar group and the
Desroches (combined area 28.5 sq km), part of the British
Indian Ocean Territory since 1965, were reunited with the
Seychelles, thus restoring the land area to 30 8 sq km
Including the Aldabra lagoon, the country's area is 44 4 sw km
The largest of the islands is Mahe , which has an area
of about 14 8 sq km and is approximately 2 7 km long. Mahe
lies 1,800 km due east of Mombasa (Kenya), 3,300 km south-
west of Bombay, and 1,100 km north of Madagascar. Victoria,
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(formerly Port Victoria) , the capital of the Seychelles and
the only port in the archipelago, is on Mahe and is the only
town in Seychelles of any size with an estimated population
of 23,000 in 1977. The population in 1980 was 65,000 and the
bulk of them reside on Mahe. [Ref. 13]
The strategic location of the islands was recognized
by the British and in 1965 Desroches and the Aldabra and
Farquhar islands were originally included in the BIOT because
of their potential as military bases. The British planned
to build an air staging area on Aldabra in 196 7; the island
has ample room for a 3,600 meter runway, and anchorage is
available in the main channel leading to the lagoon. Des-
roches and the Farquhars also have some potential for military
basing. Desroches 1 deep lagoon is accessible by a milewide
channel exceeding 25 meters in depth. In the Farquhars, South
Island offers possibilities for the construction of a runway.
[Ref. 14.]
The geographic value of the Seychelles is recognized
by the U.S. which operates a satellite tracking station in
Mahe. The Seychelles is sometimes referred to as the "stra-
tegic territory at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean." In
1978, 386 vessels entered Mahe and in 1979 2,677 international
aircraft arrived bringing 78,900 visitors.
20

B. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
Oceanborne commerce has flourished in the Indian Ocean
since the earliest times. The ancient Arabs were the pioneers
of navigation and utilized the wind effect of the monsoon to
conduct trade between the Persian Gulf (PG) , eastern Africa
and India. Gradually expanding their sea routes, the Arabs
extended their trade to the coast of China and islands of
Southeast Asia. The subsequent trade in spices and silk pro-
vided the incentive for medieval European merchants to seek
a route to the Indies. This hastened the voyages of discoveries
and culminated in the 149 8 rounding of the Cape of Good Hope
by the Portuguese seafarer, Vasco Da Gama. This set off a
rash of expeditions by the Portuguese, French, English and
Dutch explorers. Foremost among these were those financed by
the British and Dutch East India Companies who carved out
trading zones throughout the area. Coinciding with the era
of the steamship was the opening of the Suez Canal which sig-
nificantly reduced the travel time between Europe and the
Orient. Ships were now independent of the seasonal wind and
required only the availability of coaling stations. Coal was
soon to give way in the face of technology to oil. The emer-
gence of oil as a major energy source caused the shifting of
trade patterns as interest began to concentrate on the major
oil producing area - the Persian Gulf. The closure of the
Suez Canal from 196 7-19 75 once again forced oceanborne commerce
between Europe and the PG/Orient to revert to the longer
21

and more expensive Cape Route. The closing of the Suez Canal
hastened the development of much larger tankers in order to
provide monetary compensation for the longer voyage by
reducing the cost per unit of goods transported.
The strategic importance of the Western Indian Ocean to
the superpowers derives from the potential control of stragegic
points within it and with the larger issue of sea lines of
communication across the 10. These matters involve interplay
between naval strategies, land-based policies, the quest for
bases (or "facilities"), and general questions of armaments
on and under the 10. [Ref. 15]
The superpowers are competing against one another for
access and influence in the 10. This concern for influence
is related in large part to the ability of the individual
superpower to operate effectively in the area. While there
are numerous similarities in the desires of each superpower
each seeks to prevent the other from establishing a privileged
position vis-a-vis key chokepoints or other strategic positions
[Ref. 16]
Prior to 1974, the focus of strategic rivalry between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union in Africa was in the area of the Horn
of Africa. This was due in large part to its closeness to
the Middle East and the vital oil fields of the Persian Gulf.
In the Horn of Africa, the previous age of Western domination
symbolized by a strong pro-Western Ethiopia was thrown into
chaos by the Ethiopian revolution and the postindependence
22

conflict with Somalia. This area provided the arena for
superpower competition which has continued to expand into
other areas of the continent.
In southern Africa we have seen the rise of successful
movements for liberation in Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe
as well as independence movements in the Seychelles, Comoros
and Mauritius.
While it cannot be denied that the Horn of Africa is
important some observers argue that the control of the southern
tip of the African continent (the Cape Route) is another point
of geopolitical importance, because much of the oil shipped
to Western Europe and America goes around the Cape. [Ref. 17]
Sub-Saharan Africa has become a region of increasing strategic
importance to the U.S., primarily because of its geographic
position vis-a-vis two critical theaters, the North Atlantic
and the Middle East - Persian Gulf. [Ref. 18]
Broad changes are occurring in the world's strategic
environment which are causing us to focus on the importance
of Africa. Particularly significant are the changing patterns
of Western and Soviet basing rights throughtout the world,
especially in the Indo-Pacific region, and the new laws of
the sea which are drastically altering the map of the world's
oceans, seaways, and choke points. [Ref. 19] The impact of
this has dramatized the role of the southern seas and the Cape
Route. The 10 is important to the Soviet Union for a number
of reasons. It provides a sea route to the eastern part of
23

the country which is of particular importance in the aspect
of a Sino-Soviet conflict. Additionally the Soviets need to
monitor the Western shipping in the area Since the loss of
Berbera, the Soviet Union has no base in the western 10
capable of providing the support available to the U.S. from
Diego Garcia. In view of developments along the 10 littoral,
increased Soviet presence in the area, and rising fear about
the safe navigation of oil vessels from the PG the U.S.
response in the area has increased. U.S. naval activity in
the 10 increased in 19 7 8-79 and the continuous development
of Diego Garcia is a definite indication that the U.S. intends
to remain in the 10. It is obvious that each superpower is
concerned with the actions of the other in the 10. Although
the current level of competition is not as intense in the 10
as it is in other strategic areas it is apparent that both
powers perceive that they have important interests in the
western Indian Ocean. Each superpower must view the area in
a regional and global aspect. Inevitably as issues such as
the freedom of navigation, access to strategic minerals, and
control of strategic territory increase in importance so will
the superpower commitment in the area. [Ref. 20]
1. Cape Route
The Cape Route is a vital commercial link for the
transportation of raw materials (including oil) and as a route
for deploying naval forces into the Indian Ocean. While the
Suez Canas was closed, 2 4,000 ships were rounding the Cape
24

each year; the figure now stands at some 16,000, including
an ever-increasing number of super tankers that cannot pass
through the canal. [Ref. 21] The closure of the Suez Canal
in 196 7 gave new impetus to the Cape Route. The Cape Route
is one of the world's prime strategic sea lines of communication
(SLOC) essentially because of the development of super- tankers
which, originating in the PG and travelling around the Cape,
can deliver oil to Western ports at a price below that of
smaller vessels transiting through the Suez Canal. Many other
commodities, such as Zambian and Zairian copper and South
African manganese, are also sent normally by way of the Cape
Route. [Ref. 22]
The importance of the Cape Route stems not only from
its posture as a funnel for Middle East oil but conservative
estimates suggest that fully 70 per cent of the strategic raw
materials needed by the members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) ply the waters around Africa. [Ref. 23]
Within sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Africa's strategic
importance is second only to that of the Horn of Africa. The
region's extensive coastline - extending from Angola south to
the Cape and north again to Tanzania can provide valuable air
and naval bases for operations in the southeastern Atlantic,
the Cape area, and the southwestern 10. [Ref. 24] Mozambique,
one of the larger states of the region , has a coastline of
over 1500 miles and three major ports.
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While we often hear absurd statements attempting to
reduce the significance of the Cape Route it is best that we
remember some of our more recent naval history. During the
Vietnam War it frequently became necessary to transfer
destroyers based on the United States east coast to Southeast
Asia. In order to facilitate their transfer, the U.S. had to
make heavy use of Luanda (Angola) and Lourenco Marques (now
known as Maputo in Mozambique) . The 2 80 0-mile distance be-
tween the two Portuguese ports left destroyers dangerously
low on fuel between them; and the program of refueling added
a number of days to the voyage. The reopening of the Suez
Canal has alleviated this problem but what if the Canal were
again closed? [Ref. 25] Can the U.S. depend on any port
facilities along the eastern seaboard of Africa? Are their
other anchorages up the East African coast or in the islands
of the WIO that would be acceptable substitutes?
Whenever one is analyzing the strategic importance of
commercial aspects of the Cape Route you must be sure to
include both wartime scenarios when alternatives could be
found and more complicated crisis scenarios when the economic
costs of not using the Cape Route would, themselves, create
serious economic problems not only for members of the Western
alliance but for many countries in the Third world. [Ref. 26]
As a point of entry into the Indian Ocean from the
South Atlantic and the reverse the Cape Route is of definite
military interest. In the event of a crisis in an area, it
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is necessary for the U.S. fleets to be able to transfer elements
from the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets to the crisis area. Due
to the distances involved and the necessity to refuel oil
burning vessels bunkering facilities are a must. These facil-
ities can be arranged in a number of ways: foreign facilities,
underway replenishment of the fleet in transit, or U.S. bases.
While the most convenient option would be to utilize foreign
facilities it must be remembered that during the 19 73 Arab-
Israeli war effective pressure was exerted against suppliers not to
provision the U.S. Navy and if African facilities are denied
to the fleet it would not be possible to deploy into the 10
without the extensive use of naval combat support ships. How-
ever, once the fleet is on station the problem begins to arise
or how to replenish the support vessels. While mathematically
it is possible to overcome this difficulty if enough tankers
are available the costs go up drastically if fuel is not
available locally. [Ref. 27]
According to the Maritime Administration of the U.S.
Department of Commerce in its publication, United States
Qceanborne Foreign Trade Routes , the routes designated TR 51
and TR 52 which provide services to South and East Africa via
the Cape are designated as essential trade routes. These
trade routes include ports in the Seychelles (Victoria)
,
Mauritius (Port Louis), Mozambique, Madagascar and the Comoro




2. The Mozambique Channel
Maritime passage and choke points must be viewed today
in a different context than they were years ago. No longer
does the historically held concept of choke points as applying
only to narrow waterways that control key exit and entrance
points for seaborne traffic hold true but in fact due to tech-
nology and other advances this concept must be broadened to
include other areas not normally considered as choke points
by the layman (such as the Mozambique Channel) . As modern
naval technology advances and comes increasingly within the
reach of littoral states, and as shipping becomes vulnerable
to harrassment or interference in a variety of new ways, the
width of choke points increase. [Ref. 29] Indeed it has even
been suggested by Geoffrey Kemp that eventually entire oceans
could conceivably be considered potential choke points.
The Mozambique Channel is approximately one thousand
miles long and is created by the island of Madagascar which
serves as a giant breakwater off the coast of Mozambique, from
which it is separated by the 250 to 500 mile (400-800 km)
channel. [Ref. 30]
It is obvious that naval and air bases at or in the
vicinity of the channel would assist in guaranteeing access
to the area and in insuring the free passage of a country's
vessels through the channel or the denial of the right of
passage to an advisary.
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Almost all of the Cape traffic from the PG passes
through the Mozambique Channel. If a hostile force was to
gain positions either along the coast of Mozambique or on
Madagascar proper it would be in an excellent position to
threaten shipping through the channel. Until recently the
African coastline facing the Channel
,
primarily Mozambique,
was under pro-Western control - the Portuguese. Not only has
this situation changed with the independence of Mozambique
in 19 75 but there is no guarantee that Madagascar will remain
friendly to Western interests if indeed its actions are now
considered pro-Western.
Shorebased intervention by anti-Western revolutionary
movements of oceanborne commerce, particularly tanker traffic,
is a very real possibility and we must take a close look at
the stability and governments of nations along the tanker
routes. One of the unpleasant facts of life today is that
money appears to be distributed with the utmost irresponsibility
to almost any movement that claims it is seeking to strike a
blow against society. Terrorism has become an attractive,
adventurous way of life, and the new weapons, such as the SA-7
heat-seeking missiles and remote-controlled bombs and mines,
have reduced the danger of detection and arrest greatly. Thus,
subversive factions in a country can often get without dif-
ficulty all the money, weapons and trained operators they
require to support their arguments. [Ref. 31] The precedent
for this type of action was set on 14 June 19 71 when a
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Liberian tanker was attacked by members of the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) with a bazooka in the
Red Sea for trading with their enemy - Israel.
There are various threats to shipping and these run
the full spectrum from organized efforts by governments to
terrorist attacks by individuals. An oil tanker is extremely
vulnerable to attack by a small combatant craft or to air-
craft. While the current threat to sea lines of communication
along the Cape Route are not of grave proportions there is the
distinct possibility that the threat could become significant
in the future. A scenario could easily be built upon the
premise that some of the countries along the route were to
obtain small, high speed, missile-equipped surface craft of
the Komar or Osa-class. The potential threat from these craft
could not be totally ignored. A threat of this type would be
particularly troublesome in confined waters, such as those
of the Mozambique Channel. The threat from aircraft operating
out of nearby airfields is also very real. The union of pre-
cision-guided missiles to small surface craft and aircraft
has effected a revolution in certain aspects of naval warfare.
One need only to think back to the destruction of the Israeli
destroyer E1LAT in 196 7 or to the more recent destruction of
the British destroyer SHEFFIELD for example. As precision-
guided weapons have increased in number and use, the threat
from such weapons has not only expanded but has become more
believable. The possibilities for the use of these weapons
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are almost infinite and it appears that the possibility exists
for the Cape Route to be interdicted at numerous points by
hostile governments or individuals. [Ref. 3]]
C. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE
The basic economic facts are fairly straightforward and
there is no overwhelming need for elaboration for it should
suffice to say that in terms of overall U.S. trade and invest-
ment, Africa is one of the least important continents and the
islands of the Western Indian Ocean are even further down on
the list. [Ref. 33] However, if we break down the data we
can find that certain African countries do possess economic
significance particularly South Africa and Zaire and their
economic significance is primarily concentrated in the private
interests of U.S. companies. The U.S. economic interest in
the area is derived primarily from the area's importance to
Europe and Japan.
Prior to independence for the countries that are the sub-
ject of this study the governing Western powers monopolized
the administration and concentrated on the exploitation of
whatever natural resources were available and continued
European access to them. All of these countries were treated
as if they were an extension of Europe and little was done to
develop the colony/country.
In economic jargon all of these countries are less-developed




The typical economic structure of one of these countries con-
sists of a large agricultural sector comprising most of the
labour force and a very small modern sector which is dependent
on the export of one or two primary products left over from
colonial days. They share the same common problem similar
to other developing nations - urbanization with its resulting
unemployment, and increased population growth. They are among
the world's least developed nations.
Trade and investment figures for southern Africa although
large in figures are relatively small when compared to the
United States global activities in the economic realm. Even
the so-called crucial raw materials which came from southern
Africa are relatively few in number. In southern Africa and
the Western 10 none of these economic factors should play a
large role in determining U.S. policy.
We cannot say that economic considerations have no role
to play in this area only that U.S. policy is not clearly moti-
vated by economic interests. In the long run the U.S. has an
economic interest in African economic growth, trade liberal-
ization, and price stability. Although the global impact of
these conditions in Africa is relatively small, they do
contribute to the strength and stability of the international
economic system and therefore are ultimately of benefit to
the U.S. Also of importance is the African role in the North-




The principal trading partners of the Western 10 are in
Western Europe although Europe's portion of African exports
has been reduced in light of Japanese and U.S. inroads into
the area. Investment links with the former colonial powers
are usually more important than those with the U.S.
1. Madagascar
Madagascar suffers from isolation and remoteness even
while lying on the world supertanker routes and possessing
the 10 ' s finest natural harbor. Subsistence farming occupies
about 85% of the population with rice as the basic food crop
and cattle raising an important side line. Madagascar's econ-
omic development has been made more difficult by the country's
terrain and its isolation from external markets. These factors
when added to the poor internal communications, shortage of
skilled labor, frequently adverse climate (cyclones), the
closure of the Suez Canal in 196 7, and the inability of the
economy to keep up with the population growth not to mention
the outbreaks of violence, political instability and rising
inflation do not paint a very bright economic picture.
a. Agricultural
Agriculture continues to be the backbone of
Madagascar's economy accounting for about two-thirds of its
revenue and one-half its G.N. P. A large variety of crops are
grown with 12 providing the rural population with much of
their food and about 90% of the country's export. The principal
export crops are coffee, vanilla, sugar, cloves and clove oil.
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Madagascar has long failed to achieve its agricultural potential.
The output of food crops and export crops over the past few
years has been stagnant or declining. Once an exporter of
rice the country now finds itself in the position of having
to import it. To reduce imports the government is trying to
make the population at least feed itself and in order to
achieve this they have been concentrating on increasing pro-
duction, improving transportation and combatting those who
are against Madagascar's socialist revolution.
Official measures to win the "battle for rice"
include a state company (SINPA) to collect the rice for milling
and marketing (1973), raising the price paid to producers (1974),
issuing ration cards for rice and controlling its sale and
price to consumers (19 75) as well as inducing Malagasys to
replace rice by wheat in their diets, (1976) creating more
farmers' co-operative societies (1977), improving irrigation
(1978) , decreasing consumption by instituting one riceless day
a week and increasing the area planted. The effectiveness of
these measures has run the full gambit from none to relative
success and is best demonstrated by the fact that Madagascar's
rice imports now account for three quarters of the country's
trade deficit.
Coffee cultivation which concerns about one quarter
of the population has remained fairly stable over the years
but unfortunately the prices have been dropping. Madagascar's




Madagascar's territorial waters were extended in
19 73 when it claimed the borders of its continental shelf out
to 180 km but by 19 80 it had only four fishing companies
engaged in limited enterprise but sea fishing is gradually
being industrialized with Japanese help.
Animal husbandry is also an area that could help
remedy the country's protein deficiency and where the govern-
ment has been attempting to industrialize the abundant
resources. It is ironic that in a country where the number
of cattle exceeds that of humans that the average Malagasy
can only afford to eat meat three or four times per month.
Beef is exported and could become a much more important part
of the export market if properly organized and managed.
In general, Madagascar's agricultural potential
is great and it possesses an unusually diversified production
pattern but development - in the form of transportaion facil-
ities, irrigation networks, storage facilities, and essential
machinery - came to late in the colonial era. Madagascar's
problem of assembling capital from its wide agricultural base
is due mainly to the lack of adequate colonial investment in
the colonial period. Madagascar inherited a very poor
infrastructure upon independence in 1960 and its economic
difficulties cannot be attributed largely to any political




Industry accounts for only about 15 per cent of
Madagascar's GNP and employs very few of the economically active
population (<1%) and is concerned primarily with processed
food, textiles, paper, cement, refined petroleum products,
paper and mining. In 1978, Madagascar only had some 2 00
industrial enterprises. Since then the government has
encouraged the expansion of existing plants making clothing
paper, refined sugar as well as those mining ventures extracting
mica, graphite and bauxite. Additionally, it has helped to
create firms producing certain types of capital goods and
those formed to mine uranium, iron and nickel. Initially,
nationalization was restricted to key sectors of the economy
such as banking, mining, transportation, foreign trade and
any endeavor which was deemed to have strategic importance.
Under the charter of state enterprise, state controlled indus-
tries are grouped according to their activities and are
managed by committees composed of representatives of the
workers, the government and participating private enterprise
if any.
The most important industrial project is that of
a ferrochrome processing plant to be built near the chromite
deposits of Andriamena and to be powered by electricity from
a hydroelectric station which is expected to begin operation
in 19 82 at Andekaleka. The rising cost of oil has given new
life to the project of extracting and distilling oil from the
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tar sands deposits of Bemalanga and coal deposits in Sakoa.
A January 19 80 announcement of oil and gas discoveries hope-
fully will signal the end of Madagascar's dependence on foreign
fuel and could lead to Madagascar becoming an oil exporter "by
19 85". This announcement should be treated with a great deal
of suspicion. Tar sands are the more likely long term source
for its domestic energy and if proper investments are made
domestic tar sands could replace one third of the current oil
imports by 19 85.
The same general observations about the agricultural
sector apply to the industrial and mining sectors. Serious
exploration of Madagascar's mineral resources were only under-
taken in 19 72 and have been centered around graphite, mica
and chromite.
c. Finance
Since Madagascar's withdrawal from the franc zone
in 1973, the budget has been growing faster than its foreign
trade, on which most of its revenues depend. Increasing food
and oil imports, coupled with reduced exports, has resulted
in a five-fold increase in Madagascar's external trade deficit.
As a result of poor trade performance, the country's foreign
exchange reserves have been drastically reduced falling to $5
mn at the end of 1979 and recovering only to $9.2 mn by May
19 80. Since January 19 80, Madagascar has been in arrears in
respect to imports and services. [Ref. 35]
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Madagascar receives large amounts of aid mostly
from France, the EEC, Western Europe and international organ-
izations. Since 1912, Madagascar has received financial aid
from the Socialist countries in particular China which
furnished loan credits and local projects. In 19 7 8 the U.S.
supplied $1.9 mn in food aid and scholarships but no economic
aid. At present the only U.S. bilateral aid is humanitarian
assistance handled by private charitable organizations such
as the Catholic Relief Services.
Madagascar has long suffered from a low level of
production investment and its annual investment rates are
among the poorest of any developing country. Since leaving
the franc zone in 19 73, Madagascar has found difficulty in
offering long-term finance in foreign currency and this is
essential for the realization of industrial projects. [Ref. 36]
Economic growth has been slowed by official policies
which have discouraged the private economic sector but the
government is now promoting investment (domestic and foreign)
in order to raise production and restore economic growth and
development.
d. Foreign Trade
France remains Madagascar's primary trade partner
along with the EEC accounting for some 32 per cent of its
imports (compared with 11% for the U.S.) and 26 per cent of
its exports (compared with 15% for the U.S.). Madagascar's
trade with Eastern Europe remains minimal and armaments are
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the main commodity in that relationship. A new development
in Madagascar's favor has been an increase in trade with
mainland Africa.
























The economy of Mozambique is also characterized by a
large traditional subsistance and small farm agricultural
sector with 88 per cent of the working population thus engaged
providing 80% of the exports but only 25 per cent of the GNP.
Mozambique, unlike Madagascar, due to its strategic coastal
location in Africa serves as an outlet for the mineral rich
countries of southern Africa and the service sector of the
economy accounts for 6 5 per cent of the GNP primarily from




With independence in 19 75, the FRELIMO government
inherited a colonial economy in which agriculture had been
developed to supply cheap raw materials to Portugal and there
was a small domestic market for Portugal's products. In
addition, the Portuguese left Mozambique an enormous debt and
an economy that was geared to serving the interests of Portugal,
South Africa, Rhodesia and the West. The economic policies
pursued during the colonial effort neglected the domestic
development in the rural African sector and in the area of
mineral mining. Little was done to exploit mineral resources
or to create a framework that would support a relatively self-
sufficient economic system that was capable of integrating
a growing population into the production process.
Compared to other African countries, Mozambique is in
a relatively good position. It is underpopulated, possesses
large amounts of unexplored/unexploited resources - agri-
cultural and mineral, and has access to several key ocean
ports. The Constitution of 1975 stated that the country's
land and subsoil resources were the property of the state,
which was to determine their development and use. In keeping
with socialist ideology the state owned sector was to be the
leading and driving factor in the economy and collective forms
of enterprise were encouraged although personal property was
recognized.
New priorities were given to agriculture and education
as well as to a reduction on the country's dependence on
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Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia, and to the development
of a system that would integrate the different areas of the
country. In typical socialist fashion long-term development
programs were drawn up but they were/are handicapped by a
lack of statistical data on which to base an assessment of
the economy, shortage of trained personnel, poor government
institutions, lack of financial resources, and the fact that
the government was preoccupied with political matters.
FRELIMO is dedicated to creating a socialist/communist
economy with state control of production and distribution and
its closer ties to capitalism should not be interpreted as a
diminished commitment to socialism. The economy, as in the
case of other sectors of activity in Mozambique, was placed
in a straightjacket of Marxist ideology. The results have
been disastrous in the agricultural and industrial sectors and
Mozambique today remains one of the poorest countries in
southern Africa with its per capita income lower than any
other country in the subcontinent except Malawi and Zaire
(about $140 in 1978)
.
a. Agricultural
Agriculture which includes fishing and forestry
is the basis for the economy and agricultural raw materials
provided the base for most industrial activity with five crops
cotton, copra, cashew nuts, sugar and tea - constituting the
bulk of the country's exports. Since independence there has
been a serious decline in agricultural production which is
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usually attributed to two factors: most of the white farmers
have abandoned their lands and fled the country, and as
collectivization has progressed yield per acre has declined.
[Ref. 37]
The performance of crops is particularly hard to
evaluate as there is a scarcity of reliable data as well as
fluctuations caused by floods and droughts. The main sub-
sistence crops are maize, rice, sorghum, millet, groundnuts
and cassava. Livestock is of secondary importance, due to
the existence of the tsetse fly in about two-thirds of the
country and ordinarily the country does not produce enough
fresh meat for its own needs. Fishing is not a well-developed
industry in Mozambique despite its long coastline and the
volume of fish imported is greater than the annual catch
although prawns are becoming an important exchange earner.
Fishing is a relatively recent development and Cuban experts
are training crews and a bright future seems assured for
industrial fishing.
b. Industrial
Industrial growth did not really begin until the
1960's and manufacturing was still in its infancy at the time
of independence. It was characterized by a predominance of
industries processing agricultural raw materials, small plant
size, and low output and accounted for about 10 per cent of
GNP. Mozambique is still dependent on South Africa for most
of its industrial products.
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Approximately 4 7 per cent of Mozambique's manu-
facturing industries are located in Maputo or close by (Matola)
and food processing is still the main sector of production.
FRELIMO has sought to bring about decentralization by
encouraging new industries to locate in Northern Mozambique.
It is estimated on the whole that industrial output has been
reduced by 30-50 per cent since independence in an area that
was just in its infancy.
An oil refinery was built in Maputo in 1961 and a
special oil terminal for crude oil was established at Matola
to take advantage of break bulk deliveries. In May 19 77, the
government nationalized the oil refinery and employed Rumanian
technicians to run it. There is also a strategic oil pipeline
from Beira to Umtali in Rhodeisa.
Those manufacturing industries which were abandoned
by their Portuguese owners were nationalized and have been
taken over by workers and run as collectives. Production on
the average is only about a third of previous levels.
The list of Mozambique's underground deposits
reads like a geological dictionary. These include gold, copper,
coal, diamonds, natural gas and perhaps oil. Mozambique has
the world's largest known reserves of colombo-tantalite , a
strategic mineral used in the production of hard steel.
[Ref. 38] There is as yet no great development in the area




Just prior to independence gas deposits were
reported that put Mozambique ninth in the league of world gas
deposits. [Ref. 39] Petroleum prospecting has intensified
since 19 75 but uncertainty of the new government's policies
has discouraged many companies in the field of hydro carbons.
The country's electrical generating capacity has
been expanded greatly in recent years with addition of the
Cabora Bassa high dam on the Zambezi which is the world's
fifth largest dam in kilowatt generation almost double that
of the Aswan High Dam. Funded by a South African sponsored
international consortium most of the power produced is exported
to South Africa to cover the costs of the project and
Mozambique is only now beginning to receive income from it.
(The transmission of power to South Africa has continually
been the subject of attacks by Mozambique revolutionaries




Mozambique can best be described as a service
economy for its principal neighbors South Africa, Zimbabwe,
Zambia and Malawi. This is due to the transit trade undertaken
with these countries which resulted in a well-developed system
of railroads leading to the ports with 10 access (Maputo,
Beira, and Nacala) . Along with this transit function Mozambique
also provided migrant labor to work in the mines of South




The importance of the services sector in the
economy is explained by Mozambique's coastal position and the
mineral wealth of its neighbors. Railroads play a dominant
part in the economy carrying some 7,886,000 tons of freight
in 19 79. Revenue from South African use of Mozambican railways
and harbors amounted to about $9 3 million in 19 77. In February
19 79 Mozambique concluded an agreement with South Africa that
will raise South African exports through Mozambique to 30-35,000
tons per day by late 1981. In June 1980, Zaire, Zambia,
Zimbabwe and Mozambique agreed on a 10-year program to maximize
co-ordinated use of Mozambican railways and harbors at a cost
of $2,000 million to alleviate the transport problems of the
three first-mentioned countries and the Mozambican dependence
on South African traffic.
The reduction of Mozambican labor recruited for
South African mines to 30-40,000 from a previous recruitment
of 100,000 combined with suspension of the payment of the
wages in gold by South Africa at a bonus rate have reduced
Mozambique's foreign exchange earnings greatly. This had an
adverse effect on the economy in many ways.
Since independence, Mozambique's tourist industry
which was centered at Beira and Maputo has almost ceased to
exist due to the general insecurity of the country and the
fear of the Rhodesian and South African visitors. By 19 78,
all organized tourism had ceased but Mozambique's need to earn
more foreign currency necessitated the dispatch of a FRELIMO
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delegation to South Africa in January 1979 at which time it was
announced that Mozambique was to reopen the country's borders
to South African tourists,
d. Finance
Since independence, the Mozmbican budget has been
characterized by an increasing deficit. The regular government
budget is expected to show an accumulated deficit of $720 mn
in 1980.
The huge fall in output of Mozambique's five main
agricultural export crops have meant the loss of export rev-
enue even if the value of imports would have remained at the
same level.
Mozambique's constant trade deficits were usually
partially offset by the invisible surplus obtained from tourism,
the shipment of foreign goods by Mozambique's railways and
ports, and the supply of labor to South African mines. Not
only are the trade deficits widening but the earnings of the
invisibles are substantially declining.
The total public sector deficit is also growing
when the losses incurred by the nationalized industries (all
of which are self-financing and borrow from the government
banking system to cover their deficits) are taken into account.
These deficits are financed by the central bank with a consequent
growth in money supply, which has increased inflation and the
balance of payments deficit.
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The government has undertaken a review of foreign
debts in order to obtain a more accurate picture of claims
that foreign debt obligations will have on future earnings.
On March 31, 1978, Mozambique's foreign debt obligation
totaled some $110.5 mn.
A drastic austerity program which involved rationing
and freezing of imports and salaries was undertaken and in
August 19 79, President Machel turned to private investors to
boost development.
Mozambique has to date signed mutual cooperation
and development assistance agreements with the following 18
countries: Bulgaria, China, Cuba, North Korea, Denmark, East
Germany, Guinea, Hungary, India, Italy, Libya, Norway, Pakistan,
Portugal, Sweden, Tanzania, the USSR and Zambia. Within these
agreements financing has been arranged for some projects
included in the national investment program. Improved relations
with Western countries could also lead to help for the first
time from the main multilateral donors. [Ref. 40]
The continuing congressional ban on AID to Mozambique
remains a source of bitterness among Mozambican leaders,
e. Foreign Trade
Mozambique neither publishes international trade
statistics nor does it provide official balance of payments
statistics on a transaction basis. However, the latest UN




TREND OF FOREIGN TRADE (mn$ ) [Ref. 41]
1976 1977 1978
Imports 396 495 635
Exports 147 150 205
Balance -249 -345 -450
MAIN ITEMS OF TRADE (mn$ ) [Ref. 42]
EXPORTS IMPORTS
Cashew Nuts 50 Food Products 90
Prawns & Lobster 25 Crude Oil 105
Raw Cotton 20 Textiles 45
Tea 20 Equipment 155
Cement 10 Spare Parts 55
Other 80 Ind. Raw Mat. 155
205 635
In 19 77, Mozambique's principal imports (dollar
value) were from South Africa, Fed. Republic of Germany,
Portugal, Iraq, the United Kingdom, and Japan while her
principal exports were to the U.S.A., Portugal, United Kingdom,
South Africa, Netherlands and Japan.
3 . Comoros
Even before its independence from France in 19 75, the
economy of the Comoros was in terrible condition. The French
had paid for the majority of the substantial imports of food
necessary for the survival of the population and when France
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decided to curtail all aid upon independence the population
faced starvation. The U.N. provided for emergency shipments
of rice to the islands and the crisis was averted when the
Arab States decided to furnish the country with some sizeable
loans in 19 76.
There is an absence of reliable data on the economic
affairs of the Comoros and in general it can be said that
things are no better or no worse than the years before.
a. Agricultural/Industrial
Agriculture is the most important economic activity
furnishing over 95 per cent of the exports which are mainly
vanilla, essential oils, cloves, copra, coffee and cocoa.
There is a chronic shortage of cultivable land and the popu-
lation has been increasing. Local subsistence farming with
basic implements and techniques cannot keep up with the popu-
lation. The yields per acre are poor, storage facilities
non-existent and most of the choice land is set aside for
export crop production. The main food crops are cassava,
sweet potatoes, rice and bananas. Practically all meat and
vegetables must be imported along with additional amounts of
rice.
The French had encouraged only the development
of estate grown cash crops of vanilla, ylang-ylang, copra and
cloves. Most of the profits were transferred abroad and the




Programs are currently being undertaken to increase
coconut and copra production under the auspice of an IDA loan
and the UNDP is planning projects in agriculture, land use and
fisheries. Fishing is underdeveloped and only carried out on
a small scale.
The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
has committed $8 million for the development of the port of
Mutsamudu on Anjouan. The balance of this $41 mn project is
coming from the KDFAED , the OPEC FUND , the SFD and other
agencies and banks. The project is designed to expand the
port's facilities so that it can receive much larger freighters.
[Ref. 43]
The Comoros lack the physical infrastructure that
is necessary for the development of the islands. The trans-
portation system is highly inadequate and the improvement of
the road network is a necessity prior to agricultural development
The island's docking facilities are inadequate and basic with
large ships unloading offshore into dhows which is very dif-
ficult in the cyclone season. Most freight is transhipped
from Dar Es salaam or Reunion and pilferage is a constant
problem. [Ref. 44]
In the past little was done to improve the
productivity of the small farms which are the key to the
agricultural sector. Although the island is lacking in
natural resources, there is still room for expansion of crop
production, the development of a fishing industry and small
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scale livestock raising, as well as small industries. Skilled
manpower must be trained and a source of external aid must be
secured.
The islands, already overcrowded in relation to
the resources available, have a severe population problem that
must be corrected. The government does not possess a popu-
lation policy and there are no programs designed to aid family
planning. These programs must be undertaken soon or the prob-
lems of overpopulation will increase and in fact accelerate.
Technical assistance is needed in all areas and
this assistance will be needed for a number of years before it
can be phased out. According to the World Bank, the Comoros
might be able to achieve budgetary self-sufficiency in a 10
to 15 year period of time if they can receive a reliable long
term commitment for aid. [Ref. 45]
b. Finance
French aid up until 1975 allowed the Comoros to
operate a permanent trade deficit as well as a budgetary one
but allowed for no development. After declaring itself "The
Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros" several Arab
organizations came forward in 19 76-77 with financial aid.
These include the Arab League, the Arab Bank for Economic
Development in Africa, and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic
Development. The People's Republic of China also assisted.
Following the coup of May 19 7 8 relations improved with France
and French aid began anew while additional financial assistance
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was obtained from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman and the
EEC. Loans have also been granted by the African Development
Fund and OPEC.
The 19 81 Budget estimates expenditures of
$13.8 million and capital spending of 4.1 million. A total
of $6.5 million was to be found from external sources - mainly
the EEC, Kuwait and the People's Republic of China - to cover
the recurrent budget deficit.
c. Foreign Trade
The Comoros principal trading partners in 19 77
for imports were France, Madagascar, Kenya and Tanzania,
Pakistan and the People's Republic of China and for exports
France, the U.S.A., Madagascar and the Federal Republic of
Germany. The dollar value of imports was greater than that
of exports by a ratio of 2:1.
4 . Mauritius
Mauritius is an excellent example of a one-crop
economy. Sugar is the principal crop and accounts for about
seventy-five percent of the foreign exchange earnings. Occu-
pying over ninety percent of the cultivable land and engaging
about thirty percent of the work force sugar is king. This
being the case economic growth is dependent upon the world





Sugar is the major crop and is grown on almost
one half of the area of the island. There are a number of
large sugar estates on the island with their own processing
factories in addition to thousands of small planters. The
sugar industry on Mauritius is faced with numerous problems
including; rising labor costs, low productivity, rising costs
of fertilizer and machinery, and cyclones or adverse weather.
All sugar is marketed through the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate.
Most of the island's sugar was traditionally sold
to Britain at a guaranteed price but under the Lome Convention
of 19 75 Mauritius was given a quota of 500,000 metric tons to
be provided to the EEC. Production in 1979 had risen to about
700,000 tons but a series of cyclones at the end of the year
and in 19 80 reduced the 19 80 output to 4 75,000 tons. [Ref. 46]
A guaranteed price for the sugar is negotiated
yearly within the EEC and until 19 81 the world market price
had been higher than the guaranteed price. Only a small
portion of Mauritian sugar is sold on the world market and
the main buyers are Canada, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The
low sugar output of 19 80 coupled with a rising import bill
has led to a negative balance of payments. Production needs
to be increased through modernization but the natural topo-
graphy of the island makes this very difficult and costly.




A Tea Development Authority was established in
19 71 to accelerate tea cultivation in the highlands and
Mauritius has become an exporter of tea on a small scale.
The tea production has been held back by labor shortages and
rising costs of production. Tobacco is the other cash crop
of the island.
Mauritius has become self-sufficient in poultry
meat and egg production however it is deficient in rice, milk,
beef and pork. Fish is usually imported and the infant fishing
industry is receiving technical assistance from the Soviets
and the Japanese. A joint tuna packing company was estab-
lished with the aid of the Japanese in 19 72 and this company
exports to the EEC. In 1980, Mauritius received its first
shipment of tuna from the Seychelles for processing.
The Mauritian industrial sector is small and
concentrates on the area of import substitution of consumer
products in an effort to reduce the island's high import bill.
The government has adopted a policy of Export Processing
Zones (EPZ s ) which focus on labor-intensive processing of
imported goods which are in turn exported. This is an attempt
to reduce the country's dependence on the sugar industry and
unemployment. Total exports from the EPZs have increased and
it is expected that eventually they will play an important




Tourism is currently the third most important
earner of foreign exchange for the island. The majority of
tourists are from Reunion, South Africa, France and Britain.
The rising cost of fuel, overseas recessions, and the cyclones
of 19 79-80 have had an adverse effect on the tourist industry
and the Mauritian economy. Tourist arrivals have been declining
since 19 80 and no new construction has taken place in the
tourist industry since 19 78. [Ref. 47]
c. Finance
Mauritius has obtained aid from both bilateral
and multilateral sources. In the bilateral area the primary
donors have been Britain, France, India and the Federal
Republic of Germany while in the multilateral area the World
Bank, the Arab Development Fund Bank, the European Development
Fund and various othe r Arab sources have provided the funds
.
The external public debt increased sharply in
1978 rising to $270.3 million. Foreign reserves at the end
of August 19 80 were estimated to be an alarming $13.2 million
which barely covered a weeks worth of imports. Needless to
say Mauritius finds itself in a very acute balance of payments
crisis. [Ref. 48] By mid-1979 World Bank loans had risen
to $14.3 million. The IMF has again come to the aid of the
island by approving a new standby agreement which allows for
reconstruction expenditure, while limiting the 19 80/81 balance
of payments deficit to SDR 75 million ($97 million) . A "two
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year" plan designed to bring the economy into equilibrium was
published in September 19 80. The targets of this plan are an
improved balance of payments, reduction of the budget deficit,
and a real growth rate of 5 to 6 percent. All of this looks
fine on paper but it is based upon a rapid recovery in 19 81
which in turn is dependent on a good sugar harvest. [Ref. 49]
Because of its poor economic performance due to the low sugar
output in 19 81, Mauritius is unable to obtain commercial
credit from Western banks and must look for other sources of
aid. [Ref. 56] Soaring inflation and rising unemployment
along with the drastic impact of the cyclones and their
resulting damage to crops, buildings and communications have
placed the economy in a desperate position.
Despite government action inflation and balance
of payments appear to be beyond their control. The IMF
agreement provides a medium term solution but places strict
conditions on the aid. The outlook for the 19 80s does not
appear to be very encouraging. The forecasts call for in-
creasing unemployment and the inability to create enough new
jobs despite the "two year" plan. Free social services and
state subsidies cannot be continued unless money is contributed
by those employed. The future of the EPZ is in doubt in
Mauritius as it will face competition from newly created




FOREIGN TRADE (in million Mauritian rupees) [Ref. 52]
1977 1978 1979
Exports f.o.b. 2,041.2 1,195 2,855
Imports c.i.f. 2,950.8 3,075 3,500
Trade Balance -909.6 -1,100 -645.0
Mauritius exports the largest amount of its goods
(dollar value) to Britain, South Africa, France, Japan,
Australia and West Germany. Mauritius does import about the
same amount of goods from the U.S. that it does from China however
trade with the Soviet Union appears to be insignificant.
5. The Seychelles
Traditionally the Seychelles has been a plantation
economy which produced copra, cinnamon, vanilla and patchouli
along with dried fish and guano for export. With the opening
of an international airport in 19 71, all of this changed.
Although agriculture is still important, tourism has become
the dominant sector of the economy. In fact, tourism has
become so dominant that the government is attempting to bring
back traditional industries and establish new ones in order
to become less dependent upon tourism.
The Seychelles has been placing alot of emphasis on
the exploitation of its territorial waters both for the
development of a fishing industry and the exploration of oil.
Since independence Britain and France have provided
most of the Seychelle's economic aid but that has begun to
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change. The Seychelles usually runs a trade deficit that must
be offset by aid, private capital investment and the service
sector (tourism). [Ref. 53]
a. Agricultural
Being a scattered group of small islands the area
of cultivable land is extremely limited and in most cases the
soil is not of good quality. The Seychelles is dependent on
imported food and the government is attempting to reduce this
dependency. The country's five year plan which was begun in
19 78 and was revised in 19 79 and 19 80 concentrates on increasing
agricultural production. By extending land settlement schemes
and creating more commercial farms under the Seychelles Agri-
cultural Development Company (SADECO) the government hopes to
raise food production. Another priority is the development of
some of the outer islands which could become sources of food.
If settlement of the outer islands of Coetivy, Farquhar,
Desroches, Astove and Providence can be undertaken it is felt
that agricultural production and the annual fish catch will
both increase. The five islands that are targeted for
development will receive investment in the fishing and copra
industries as well as basic infrastructure (housing, roads,
water, electricty, etc.). Settlers will be given parcels of
land and homes and the administration will buy their cash
crops. [Ref. 54]
Until recently the fish resources were scarcely
exploited by the Seychelles and only enough fish were caught
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to supply domestic consumption and a small export industry.
In 19 78, the Seychelles National Fishing Company (SNAFIC) was
established to begin exporting tuna with projected earnings
of $4-6 million per year. The Seychelles has received aid
from four countries in its endeavor: Libya has donated two
aircraft for fishing surveillance, Spain has agreed to teach
Seychellois fishermen tuna fishing, India sent a delegation
to advise on marine farming, and France has sent four tuna
boats and conducted a feasibility study of fish stocks in the
area. [Ref. 55] Also in 1978, the Seychelles declared a 200
mile "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ) which was designed to
reduce the activities of foreign fishing fleets which freely
operated in the area. Foreign vessels are now required to
purchase licenses if they intend to fish in the EEZ. Britain,
France, Libya and India provide assistance in the patrolling
of the EEZ. A joint fisheries venture has been undertaken
with Iraq.
b. Industrial
Under the National Development Plan several small
industrial projects have been undertaken primarily in the
agro -industria 1 field. Most of these were designed in the
short run for import substitution but it is hoped that later
they will develop into exports. These include fruit juice
and milk processing, a pork processing plant and pig farm, a
plant for processing copra into coconut oil, a salt-making
plant and an ice-making plant for the fishing industry. Aid
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for these projects has come from India, Abu Dhabi, Britain,
France and Iraq as well as various international agencies,
c. Tourism
About 90 percent of the foreign exchange earned
is provided by tourism. Since the opening of the international
airport in 19 71 the number of tourists has risen from three
thousand to some seventy-eight thousand in 19 79. The climate
is a very pleasant tropical maritime one and the islands are
known for their spectacular mountains and ocean scenery.
[Ref. 56] Much of the revenue earned from the tourist trade
leaves the country in order to pay for the food and other
goods utilized by the tourists and the tourist industry. Only
about 14 percent of the revenue goes to the government primarily
through hotel and restaurant taxes. The number of tourists
visiting the islands in 19 80 began to decline mainly due to
the rise in air fares. It is anticipated that recovery will
commence now that air fares have been reduced. Airport fa-
cilities are currently being modernized to handle the expected
increase in tourists. The prohibition of South African Air-
ways flights to the islands which began in 19 80 greatly
affected the important tourist trade from that country. Until
the recent coup attempt of November 19 81, this trade was
returning to normal levels through the use of Swaziland air-
lines. The primary influx of tourists come from France,
Britain and Ireland but efforts are being undertaken to
attract tourists from the Middle East, the United States and
60

the Far East. The government maintains strict controls on
tourist development taking into account environmental and
social considerations. A maximum limit of 120,000 visitors
per year has been established. If the tourist recession
continues it will have an overall dampening effect on the
economic activity of the Seychelles since it accounts for
about 20 percent of the G.D.P.
d. Finance
Since 19 79, the Seychelles rupee has been linked
to the IMF Special Drawing Right (SDR) instead of sterling.
This was influenced by a desire to achieve a more stable
exchange rate.
The trade deficit always appears large with ex-
ports only accounting for about 20 percent of the dollar value
of imports. Most of the imports are machinery, transport
equipment, petroleum products, and food and beverages for the
tourist industry. This deficit is countered by the earnings
from the tourist sector and external aid along with private
investment. While there was a small balance of payments
deficit in 19 79 this was overcome in 19 80 at which time the
Seychelles managed without budgetary aid from Britain for the
first time. Until recently most aid came from Britain but the
Seychelles has now diversified and receives its aid from a
host of sources including the World Bank, the EEC, Western
Europe, India and Arab countries and funds.
61

Despite the fact that the government has taken
over major shareholding in key sectors through the Seychelles
National Investment Corporation there is no general national-
ization policy and the government encourages foreign investment.
The Finance Ministry has denied rumors that the government
intends to introduce exchange controls [Ref. 57] and taxed
profits are easily repatriated. The G.D.P. has continued to
grow.
e. Foreign Trade
EXTERNAL TRADE (R million)
1977 1978 1979
Imports c.i.f. 349.7 402.1 561.7
Exports f.o.b. 77.8 96.1 114.5































The Seychelles principal trading partners in 19 78 for imports
(dollar value) were Britain, Kenya, South Africa, Singapore,
Japan and Baharain and for exports Pakistan, India, Reunion
and Mauritius. Britain supplied over 25 per cent of the
dollar value of all imports.
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III. THE REGIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION
Less than a decade ago the islands of the WIO were
secluded and obscure, existing in a world distant from all
major sources of power and under the colonial mastery of
weakening European "empires". Only the Malagasy Republic
(Madagascar) was formally independent but so closely aligned
with France that its independence was more fiction than fact.
The Comoros were firmly attached to France while the British
governed the Seychelles and Mauritius, and the Portuguese
controlled Mozambique. The development of the areas role in
world politics will be examined from the period since 19 71.
With the announced historic British military withdrawal "East
of Suez" in 196 8, the necessity of France to reevaluate its
position in 19 72 after the political change in Madagascar,
and Mozambique's independence from Portugal in 19 74 the
political complexion of the WIO was to change. Into an area
previously dominated by fading European empires came the
superpowers: the United States, the Soviet Union and China.
The communist nations have displayed a long interest in the
area and the unstable political atmosphere of the countries
in the WIO presents a unique opportunity for them. The
countries of the WIO are generally politically unstable and
poor with no stable regional actor to influence them.
Commencing with the 1970 r s the islands of the WIO were
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undergoing political change as they attempted to find their
own identity. Colonial influence was cast aside by the new
countries and a great deal of hostility was directed at the
former colonial power.
It appears that through a coincidence of fate that just
at the moment that the superpowers were becoming aware of the
vacuum in the WIO the area was undergoing a traumatic political
realignment which was opposed to external interference.
Throughout the area there was a great outcry for external
powers to keep out of the Indian Ocean. The heritage of the
colonial period had left a strong distaste for non-regional
powers, whether they were communist or noncommunist.
The Third World/non-aligned nations in the world form a
formidable voting bloc in the United Nations and this gives
the states a great deal of political influence in the inter-
national arena. It is of utmost importance for the United
States to maintain this influential voting bloc on its side
in world affairs.
The politics of the countries of the WIO will be addressed
in detail in the following sections. [Ref. 58]
A. MADAGASCAR
In 1890, Britain recognized France's commanding position
on the island of Madagascar. France annexed the island in
1896. This incorporation into the French political and
economic realm did not resolve the ethnic and religious
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conflicts between the Merina tribe who were Malayo-Polynesian
and converted to British Protestantism and the Negroid coastal
tribes or cotiers who were converted to Catholicism by the
French . By 1905 the French conquest of the island was
completed and French institutions introduced (administration,
schools, medical clinics, etc.) and the island was integrated
into France's economy.
The Merina, who were better educated, resented their
subordinate status to the Europeans. They looked upon them-
selves as the rightful rulers of Madagascar and various
national "plots'* were to take place beginning in 1915. A
violent revolt in 194 7 was inspired by the Merina but the
cotiers bore the punishment. The results of this event are
still felt to this day and this episode only served to increase
the hostility between the two main ethnic groups on the island.
In order to counteract the more nationalistic and educated
Merina the French colonial administration developed a political
party, the Parti Social Democrate (PSD), composed of cotiers .
The PSD was officially formed in 19 5 7 under the leadership of
Philibert Tsiranana an educated cotier who had obtained poli-
tical experience in the French national assembly as Madagascar's
deputy and had joined the socialist party. The PSD expanded
and in 19 6 Q when Madagascar was granted independence Tsiranana
was elected the first president. The granting of independence
by France in 1960 without an armed struggle was a decisive




The constitution of 1959 was based on the French presi-
dential model. The structure it set up enabled Tsiranana to
build a strong central government and consolidate his power.
In the legislature and senate all but a scarce few were
members of the PSD. Eventually the PSD incorporated all
except two rival parties and the only significant political
opposition was the left-wing Party of the Congress of
Independence (AKFM) formed in 19 58 by a Merina Protestant
minister, Richard Andrianamanjato. The conflict between the
cotiers and the Merina continued on political, cultural, geo-
graphic and ethnic grounds.
Peace and stability ended after 1969. The island's economy
was hard hit by the closure of the Suez Canal in 196 7 and the
devaluation of the franc in 196 9 as well as the French strikes
of 196 8. The government encountered increasing opposition
when it attempted to confirm monopolies on French firms and
to cultivate closer relations with South Africa. These two
issues caused PSD dissidents to join with the AKFM against the
government. Up until this time Madagascar's diplomatic
relations were limited to countries of the Western bloc although
there were trade agreements with the Soviet Union and the
Eastern bloc. Traditionally the Malagasy who felt superior
or indifferent to the Africans, have remained separated from
the African mainland. Tsiranana could see the danger inherent
in isolation so he joined organizations developed by moderate
francophone Africans and became a staunch supporter of the




Tsiranana became seriously ill in 1969. While he was
away from Madagascar disagreement within the PSD on economic
policies became a serious issue (as was the question of his
successor). Returning in May 1970 , the elections of September
19 70 reinforced PSD's position on the island and limited the
AKFM base to the urban Merina population. In April 19 71, the
peasantry in the Toliary region belonging to the MONIMA oppo-
sition party under Monja Jaona took up arms against the
government because of excessive taxation and abuses of local
officials. There were many deaths and the revolt was crushed
but it had transformed a leftwing regional group into an
opposition movement comprising students and urban radical
elements. The U.S. Ambassador and a large part of his staff
were expelled in 1971.
Tsiranana became obsessed with saving Madagascar from
communist subversion. He demoted the PSD's most outstanding
member who proposed a more nationalistic and socialistic
policy and he strengthened links with South Africa despite
intense opposition within his own party. He presented himself
as the sole candidate in the elections of January 19 72 and
interpreted his victory as overwhelming popular support for
himself and his platform. On 13 May 19 72 riots broke out
between security forces and a union of students, teachers and
laborers which became the KIM or Federation of the May 13th
Movement. After a violent three days Tsiranana turned over
full authoritv to General Ramanantsoa chief of staff of the
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armed forces who was a Merina without any political
aspirations.
Displaying even handedness and adopting a pragmatic
approach, Ramanantsoa eliminated the violence and won wide-
spread support. Installing loyal military officers to
governmental posts and as provincial governors he ensured
control. His background as an officer in the French army was
very reassuring to France who maintained troops on the island
but had thus far not intervened in Tsiranana's behalf.
Tsiranana was retained as a figurehead president despite strong
protests by radical students.
The KIM was pacified by Ramanantsoa' s policy of renegotiating
cooperation agreements with France, liberation of political
prisoners and the termination of diplomatic relations with
Israel, South Africa and Taiwan. Freedom to express political
views was endorsed by Ramanantsoa but he also assumed the
authority to declare martial law. Receiving support from all
of the political parties with the exception of the PSD and
extreme KIM followers Ramanantsoa received about 80 percent
of the vote in the October 19 72 election. This polarity
enabled him to remove Tsiranana and dissolve all existing
elected institutions and designate 19 77 as the year for
national elections and a constitutional referendum.
Ramanantsoa established diplomatic relations with China,
the Soviet Union, Vietnam and the People's Democratic
Republic of Korea and various Arab states along with
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strengthening ties to African states. The PLO and the
Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara were also recognized.
His most controversial policy was his cultural policy of
promoting Malagasy as it revived cotier fear of a Merina
dominated state. Riots and strikes disrupted the country
from December 19 72 - April 19 73 and threatened to culminate
in civil war. The renegotiation of cooperation agreements
with France undertaken by Lieutenant Commander Ratsiraka
satisfied the most ardant nationalists in particular the
radicals. Under the new agreement, Madagascar withdrew from
the franc zone in May and OCAM in August 19 73. In addition,
France was to evacuate its air and naval installations on the
island by September.
Madagascar's trade and finance suffered a sharp decline
after the break with France. Mismanagement and corruption
had crept into the economy and administration and the unity
of the armed forces began to errode. Officers in the cabinet
began to express different ideologies and soon factionalized
into moderate and radical groups. Friction between cotiers
and the Merina increased along with political turmoil and
violence.
In December 1974, a mutiny by a mobile police garrison
near the capitol forced Ramanantsoa to make the first changes
in the Government he had established in 1972. Suddenly on 5
February 19 75 Ramanantsoa turned his power over to Col.
Ratsimandrava who was assasinated six days later. It has
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been said that Ratsimandrava was uncorruptable and this may
have been the reason for his assassination. A military
directorate under General Andriamahazo consisting of 18
military members including Ratsiraka took over. Loyal troops
put down the mutiny but martial law was declared, the press
was censored and political parties were suspended.
On 24 March 1975, Ratsiraka became the head of the govern-
ment. He was a fairly popular individual who was known as a
diplomat; he had kept his reputation clean by not taking part
in Ratsimandrava 's government or in his assasination. How-
ever, he does not appear to have much knowledge of the rural
society in Madagascar. Ratsiraka maintained the Higher
Council on Institutions to monitor the constitution and
renamed the military directorate. He created a military
Supreme Revolutionary Council under his command. In July he
closed the U.S. satellite-tracking station and began to expand
his policy of socialism. In his "Little Red Book" of the
Malagasy Socialist Revolution he pledged to expand the Merina
village communities and to carry out agricultural and admin-
istrative reforms while reorganizing the armed forces into
an instrument of development to execute his programs. He
began to pursue a foreign policy of improved relations with
communist and Arab states in addition to support for anti-
imperialist liberation movements in the Third World.
Ratsiraka held a referendum in December 19 75 to legitimize
his government. This referendum elected him to a seven-year
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term as President of the Democrat Republic of Madagascar and
empowered him with the means to apply his own form of social-
ism to Madagascar. The ideology of the state is socialist
and is expressed in the Malagasy Socialist Revolutionary
Charter.
Institutions were quickly set up to meet the requirements
of the Charter and they included the presidency, the Supreme
Council of the Revolution (CSR) , the Advisory Military
Committee for Development (CMD) , a Constitutional High Court,
a National Assembly and a cabinet appointed by the head of
state and responsible to him. In 19 76, the Vanguard of the
Malagasy Revolution (AREMA) was formed by Ratsiraka. Its
purpose was to provide ideological education and information
to the people in order to develop socialism and reject
capitalism and imperialism. AREMA quickly took control of
the country and dominated the elections of 19 77.
Proceeding on the principle that without political
independence or freedom, economic independence is an
impossibility the government has carried out the nationalization
of key sectors of the economy along with large foreign and
domestic companies. . .oil production, from import to refinement
and distribution, is under state control, as is the case with
other energy sources. The same is true of mining and trans-
portation along with other national resources. Nationalization
has been extended to about 40% of the industries, and the
remaining private industrial enterprises have accepted state
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ownership of their capital, in most cases amounting to a
majority share. Efforts are continuing to strengthen the
state sector and maintain strict control over the private
sector, however this is proceeding with a great deal of
caution. [Ref. 59]
Ratsiraka has repeatedly stressed that he aims at "drastic
and revolutionary transformation in all directions" (" trans -
formations drastiques et revolutionnaires tous azimuths " )
.
He has laid the framework for such changes but the people
are difficult to move - especially the rural masses who are,
even more ingrained in their ways than peasantries in various
other countries. The basis for Madagascar's economic revolu-
tion must be a sudden increase in its agricultural production.
[Ref. 60] The rural population in Madagascar is scattered,
separated by long distances with a bad transportation network,
and is often forced to turn inward on its own inherited social
structures. One of the basic problems both politically and
economically in Madagascar, has been how to communicate with
the rural population. [Ref. 61]
In order to undertake massive aggrarian reform it was
necessary to reorganize the country into semi-autonomous
village units ( fokontany ) with individual village councils
( fokonolona ) . Under this system Madagascar was divided into
village communities of about 500 rural inhabitants. Fokonolona
is the central element in Madagascar's attempts to decentralize
the administration and introduce socialism to the country.
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It is the spearhead of the "peasants revolution" and unlike
the Ujamaa village in Tanzania their origins can be found in
Madagascar's past. Fokonolona is a politico-economic structure
which is based primarily on rural communities. The initial
aim of fokonalona is to gain a degree of local solidarity,
encourage small communities to become as self-sufficient as
possible and to establish "decentralized collectives". In the
long run the system is designed to provide the masses, with
a direct hand in the administration of the country. Power
eventually will lie with the fokonalona rather than with a
strong central government. [Ref. 62]
Currently the real power lies with the President and the
21-members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (CSR) . The
president is Head of State, chairman of the CSR (whose members
are appointed by the president) and secretary-general of AREMA,
the main political party. The president also appoints the
Prime Minister. [Ref. 63] In short he is all powerful.
The Malagasy political structure is as follows:
1. The dominant AREMA party of the President is a broad-
based party which is influential in the capital and outlying
districts as well as in non-Merina coastal towns. It in turn
is divided into a right wing led by Simon Pierre and Rakotovao
Razakaboana which has its strength, in the Merina areas of the
high plateau while most of its senior members come from the
capital's elite families (including the President) and a left
wing headed by Ampy Portos which recruits from the student
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ranks, trade unions and in coastal areas. It controls 112 of
137 Parliamentary seats.
2. The second largest party is the pro-Soviet Independence
Party (AKFM) led by Richard Andriamanjato with its roots in
the nationalist sections of the commercial classes in and
about the capital. It has 16 Parliamentary seats.
3. The VONJY or Vanguard Party under Dr. Razanabahini
which follows a mild social democratic policy and is primarily
a coastal party with many members of former President Tsiranana's
dissolved PSD. It holds seven Parliamentary seats.
4. UDEMA is a left-wing Christian Democrat party headed
by Ramoarsata with little influence in the government.
5. The VSM, or Socialist MONIMA Bloc which is a splinter
group from the original MONIMA party.
6. The MFM (or Party of the Small People) which is faction-
alized into two sections one which supports the government and
one which does not. Both are radical and favor collectivization.
7. The MONIMA - originel party under Monja Jaona is the
most influential party outside of the government. Without
being consistently pro Chinese it does emphasize that the
Chinese revolution was correct to mobilize the rural popu-
lation for social change and development. Jaona is the
rallying point for the discontented youth of Madagascar and
is a figure closely indentified with nationalism. [Ref. 64]
The government of President Ratsiraka looks extremely
uneasy , despite the decision of Monja Jaona, the government's
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only real opposition, to rally to the regime, thereby ending
four months of house arrest (Nov 1980-Feb 1981) and violence.
The cumulative effects of the economic malaise, severe shortages
of goods and student rioting have caused Ratsiraka to grant
concessions. But the balance of power in Madagascar remains
uncertain. [Ref. 65] President Ratsiraka* s strongest card
may be the fact that, because of his previous policies, there
are no immediate alternatives to his regime for although Jao.na
symbolizes opposition to the regime he does not appear to be
a credible candidate for prime minister and the MONIMA's power
base is confined mostly to the southern part of the country.
[Ref. 66]
President Ratsiraka has driven most of the political
opposition to his rule underground and it is hard to determine
which political figures he can rely on. By extending security
controls he appears to have reinforced his position. Ratsiraka
is an admirer of North Korean leader Kim II Song and the North
Koreans opened a training institute at Tematave in 19 7 8 which
is staffed and financed by them. In addition, the President's
bodyguards were trained by the North Koreans. When Soviet
deliveries of MIG-21*s were delayed in 19 78 North Korea came
to his aid and loaned him a number of MIG-17's complete with
pilots and training crews. North Koreans and Russians have
assisted in the reorganization of the country's security arm.
The insecurity and suspicious nature of the regime poses
a hazard to political activity. Foreigners have been under
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particularly close surveillance after the coup in the Comoros
in May 19 78 led by Bob Denard and his mercenaries. The country
has been put on alert numerous times when it has been alleged
that foreign aircraft have flown over the island or submarines
were observed off of the coast. This continuing nervousness
about being deposed is a very real concern. In the period
from 1972-75 there have been six governments with five different
heads of state, one of whom was assasinated. A great deal of
political turmoil and antagonism has been experienced in
Madagascar. The terrorism and sabotage continues and presents
constant problems for the country.
Ratsiraka's foreign policy has been officially labeled as
one of "active neutralism" although he prefers to associate
with the leaders of North Korea, Tanzania and Cuba he has been
forced to look toward France to bail him out of his economic
plight. In return for this aid, France has been exerting
pressure on Madagascar's foreign policy particularly with
regard to the dispute over a number of the Mozambique Channel
islands currently occupied by France but claimed by Madagascar.
Relations with the U.S. are improving with full relations
reestablished in November 19 80 but Ratsiraka is urgently trying
to forge stronger links with African regimes in Tanzania,
Mozambique and the Seychelles while maintaining socialist
bloc connections. The Soviets have provided Madagascar civilian
and military equipment while concentrating their influence on
education and the armed forces. The total strength of the
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armed forces has risen from 4,760 in 1975 to over 18,000 in
19 80 with an influx of Soviet equipment including MIG aircraft
and Mi- 8 helicopters. The number of Malagasy students in
Russia has risen from 200 in 19 75 to 1000 in 19 80. More than
1000 military technicians and advisors from the Soviet Union,
North Korea, Cuba and East Germany are stationed in Madagascar
[Ref. 67] but thus far the Soviet requests for facilities at
the naval base of Diego Suarez have been rejected and the
Soviets are limited to a number of mooring/refueling buoys
that they have placed south of the island and in the Mozambique
Channel.
Ratsiraka has repeatedly called for an international con-
ference to make the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. He proposes
the dismantling of all foreign military bases in the region
and a reduction of forces already in the area. This proposal
is linked with Madagascar's concern over French control over
some of the smaller islands of the Indian Ocean including
Europa, Bassas de India and the Glacieusec near Madagascar;
Tromelin which is claimed by Mauritius and the island of
Mayotte that is claimed by the Comoros. [Ref. 68] This
development bears witness to a new Madagascar sense of
responsibility in dealing with Europe's residual claims in
the Indian Ocean and the fact that with the Comoros, the
Seychelles, and Mozambique independent Madagascar might accede





Mozambique had the misfortune of being a colony of
Portugal for nearly 500 years. Over that period, the Portu-
guese did not attempt to train a civil service or establish
indigenous political parties. Portugal discouraged local
participation and kept most of the population illiterate.
Opposition to Portuguese rule continued into the twentieth
century with the Portuguese controlling the country through
the use of the police and security forces as well as censor-
ship of the press. Political and economic unrest were kept
to a minimum and where it did occur the knowledge of the act
was suppressed, however strikes and uprisings did take place.
Many of the small number of educated Mozambicans fled to
nearby countries in the 1950 's; many others left in order to
obtain schooling. This group of exiles developed political
and social organizations in various countries which became the
basis for a Mozambican nationalist movement. These men were
greatly influenced by the ideas of nationalist parties in the
countries they were now located in (Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi,
Zambia, etc. ) and soon became eager to rectify things in
Mozambique. It did not take long for these expatriates to
decide that independence from Portugal was a necessity. The
Portuguese prevented these groups from organizing within




The major political groups that were formed outside of
Mozambique were the Mozambique African National Union (MANU)
which was founded in 1960 under Mathew Mwole and L.M. Millinga;
the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) organ-
ized by Adelino Gwembi in 1959 in Rhodesia; and the National
African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI) under Baltazar
Changonga formed in Malawi. These three groups were brought
together in Tanzania in 1962 under a unified organization
called the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de
Libertacao de Mocambique - FRELIMO) under Dr. Eduardo Mondlane.
The combining of these parties did not unify the independence
movement as much as had been anticipated and major splits
occurred which led to the formation of other parties. In
196 5 the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO) a
coalition of a number of these new parties was organized,
however, FRELIMO was the dominant organization. From the
creation in 1962, FRELIMO had concentrated on the formation
of a bureaucratic structure with a financial base and a pro-
gram within Mozambique. FRELIMO gained the support of the
Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity and
the Tanzanian government. FRELIMO held its first national
congress in 1962 at which time it stated its goal of attaining
self-government and independence for Mozambique. FRELIMO




In the period between 1966 and 19 70 a number of assasi-
nations occurred within FRELIMO not all of which were of
Portuguese design. This in fighting tended to heighten
tensions within FRELIMO and a number of party leaders broke
off to form minor parties. In 1969, Mondlane was killed by a
bomb sent through the mail and Samora Machel, who was commander
of the FRELIMO army, eventually became president of the
Central Committee after a brief experiment with a three-man
presidential council (Simango, dos Santos, and Machel) ended
in failure.
The ten year war for the liberation of Mozambique is now
a matter of history which ended with the agreement at Lusaka
on 7 September 19 74. Power was to be transferred to FRELIMO
and an interim - FRELIMO ruled government came into being on
25 September. Small opposition groups were quickly suppressed
and when Mozambique became independent on 25 June 19 75 FRELIMO
was in undisputed control having suppressed attempts to seize
power in September and October.
FRELIMO has been led by a small tight-knit group of men
with Machel as their leader. At independence Machel assumed
the presidency of the country a position he has retained.
Machel and his associates have dedicated themselves to making
Mozambique into a Marxist state. From the very beginning the
leaders of FRELIMO had sought creation of a society based on
socialist lines and the role of ideology was stressed.
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The Constitution of June 19 75 states that power belongs
to the workers and peasants united and led by FRELIMO and that
FRELIMO is the leading force of the state and society. The
party which determines the ideology of the state takes prece-
dence over the government. The constitution also delineates
the composition of the People's Assembly and designates it as
the supreme organ of the state and the highest legislative
organ of the Republic. This assembly was to meet twice a year
in ordinary sessions and in the interim period a 15 member
Permanent Commission elected by the Assembly from among its
members would assume the function of the People's Assembly.
The People's Assembly consisted of not more than 210 members
of FRELIMO 's Central and Executive committees; Ministers and
Vice-Ministers of the Government; Provincial governors;
members chosen by the Central Committee from among FRELIMO
and FPLM (Mozambique People's Liberation Forces) cadres; two
representatives, designated by the Central Committee, from
each provincial mass organization; and at least 10 citizens
chosen by the Central Committee.
Under the constitution the President of the People's
Republic of Mozambique is the President of FRELIMO and the
Head of State. His function is to create ministries, direct
the activities of the Council of Ministers, appoint and dismiss
members of the Council of Ministers, the President and Vice-
President of the Supreme People's Court and the Attorney
General, provincial governors, the general commander and
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deputy of the Police Corps, the rector of the university and
diplomatic representatives of the Republic; to declare a state
of war and conclude peace; to proclaim mobilization; to pro-
mulgate laws; and in the event of his death or resignation his
functions are to be assumed by FRELIMO's Central Committee who
shall nominate a new President.
The Third National Congress held in Maputo in February 19 77
designated FRELIMO as a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party and a
new 6 7-member central committee and a new 10-member permanent
political committee (which replaced the Executive Committee)
were elected. Seven of the members of the Permanent Political
Committee have been FRELIMO members since its inception in
196 3. The core of the political power in the country became
the Political Committee and the Council of Ministers.
FRELIMO's elite are not truly representative of Mozambique
on a regional or ethnic base with most of the key figures
coming from the far south of the country and being of non-
African or mixed ancestry. Their strength is in their dedi-
cation to the party and they have no strong ethnic or regional
base. Most of the actual fighters in the war for independence
came from the north and there is a significant difference
between the northerners and southerners (ethnically, culturally,
socially and religiously) . Despite appearances of similarities
the two major areas of the country are not homogenous and there
is a split which is widening as one group perceives itself
losing out to the other.
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FRELIMO is a very centralized organization which fits in
well with Marxist-Leninist models and the country's past
colonial experience. At all levels of the party and government
the final decision rests with a very small inner elite group
and the President is in control. It appears that all real
power is in the hands of President Machel who is not opposed
to utilizing it.
President Machel 's cabinet has been known for its stability
and very few have been dropped from it. His cabinet consists
of ten blacks, eight whites, and one of mixed race while two
of the black ministers are married to white South Africans.
[Ref. 70] The Council of Ministers embraces more whites than
any other government in black Africa and the People's Assembly
is particularly unusual for a black African country in that it
includes a number of white, Asian and women delegates (pro-
portionately there are more women in the People's Assembly
than there are in the U.S. House of Representatives). [Ref. 71]
FRELIMO has continued to attempt to concentrate its efforts
on consolidating hegemony over the entire country. Consistently
aware of its weakness in areas outside of the "liberated zones"
it controlled during the war FRELIMO had to set up a one party
state and then attempt to eliminate all forms of discontent.
While measures were taken to consolidate the Party and to
eliminate opposition through purges various organizations
were developed to shore up the regime including the Mozambique
Youth Organization (OJM) . FRELIMO does not tolerate rival
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centers of authority and this has led to continual internal
conflict particularly with churches and a mandatory death
penalty was introduced in 19 79 for anyone convicted of high
treason which was defined as violation of fundamental patriotic
duties by committing acts which endanger national independence,
territorial integrity, alter a state of peace or prevent FRELIMO
from freely exercising their constitutional powers. Sentences
were also provided for people found guilty of espionage and
sabotage or terrorism. [Ref. 72]
Opposition to FRELIMO continues in Mozambique and can be
traced to a number of reasons. Many of the educated people
of the country were alarmed by FRELIMO' s connection to
Marxist-Leninism and the rapid nationalization of businesses
and property as well as by the President's creation of a
secret police force under his control which was used to
suppress political opposition. Also FRELIMO launched an
assault on the religious beliefs of the people and placed
strict controls on churches. Opposition also arose over the
fact that more people from the south are in positions of power
than from the central or northern sections of the country.
Perhaps the largest feeling of discontent has resulted from
the economic problems that have beset the country since
independence (declining income, unemployment, food rationing,
gasoline rationing, etc.). Added to this was the removal of
the Portuguese as an enemy which had been the prime unifying
factor in the war. FRELIMO 1 s decision to collectivize
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agriculture by expanding the aldeamentos system which it had
campaigned against under the Portuguese rule was a serious
threat to FRELIMO * s credibility with the agricultural majority.
The Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RNM) is the most
active of all resistance movements. It formerly operated out
of Rhodesia and its members are alleged to have been trained
and equipped by the Rhodesian Special Branch. With the
independence of Rhodesia in 19 80 the RNM lost many of its
secure bases and its activities decreased for a period of time.
Recently their activities have been on the rise and they have cut the
electric lines running from the Cabora Bassa dam. Currently
it is believed that the RNM is receiving aid from South Africa,
has an office in Portugal, and that it is financed by a
Portuguese businessman by the name of Jorge Jardim. As
disillusionment within Mozambique for FRELIMO increases it
appears that the RNM will receive increased support and could
become a greater thorn in the side of the government.
Mozambique along with Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and Angola
form the so-called "frontline states" which were instrumental
in the settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. Mozambique played
a key role in this settlement as it not only gave its full
support to the war by the Zimbabwean liberation movement but
also closed off its borders to Rhodesia. Mozambique was also
instrumental in the formation of the Patriotic Front and later
was able to apply effective pressure on the Patriotic Front
and force settlement. Even the United States gave Mozambique
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the credit for breaking the final deadlock in the London talks.
[Ref. 73] Because of its actions, Mozambique suffered greatly
during the Rhodesian conflict. Rhodesian forces repeatedly
attacked targets inside Mozambique and eventually the Front-
line States were forced to coordinate their defense policies.
The border closure had drastic economic impact on Mozambique's
economy and the economy has still not recovered. A close
friendship developed between President Machel and Prime Minister
Mugabe and in January 19 81 Zimbabwe and Mozambique signed a
defence treaty which bound the countries to come to one
another's aid if South Africa attacked one of them.
While Mozambique's foreign relations are governed by a
policy of non-alignment, it desires to strengthen its relations
with other Marxist-Leninist governments as well as expanding
its relations with other regional participants. President
Machel has long been an advocate of removing white rule from
southern Africa and has been a prominent figure in attempting
to reduce the dependence of nearby states on South Africa.
He has hosted the Southern African Coordination Conference in
an effort to obtain foreign funds for regional development
projects that will make the countries more independent of
South Africa. Mozambique has often expressed concern about
military forces in the Indian Ocean and has thrown its support




While it is true that China had been the largest supplier
of aid to FRELIMO up until 19 75 because of the subsequent
events in Angola where China and FRELIMO found themselves on
opposing sides FRELIMO decided to increase its ties with the
Soviet Union. Machel has visited the Soviet Union on various
occasions and has signed aid agreements dealing with education,
commerce, fishing, air transport, etc. After President
Podgorny's visit to Mozambique in April 19 77 Machel signed a
Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. Mozambique has
since invoked this treaty in February 19 81 after a South
African attack on Matola and Soviet warships were sent to
Mozambican ports for support. Another significant event in
Mozambique-Soviet relations is that Mozambique was one of only
three countries in Africa who refused to support the UN
resolution condemning the Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan. [Ref. 79] Thus far, however, Mozambique has
refused to give the Soviets base facilities.
Cooperation between Cuba and Mozambique has continued to
grow and over 4,000 Mozambicans have been trained in Cuba.
Additionally, Cuba is attempting to build Mozambique's fishing
and shipping industry. [Ref. 75] Allegedly there were over
1200 Cubans in Mozambique in 1978 (400 technicians and 800
military personnel) and when this figure is added to that of
other communist personnel it appears that some 2 400 Communist
technical and military personnel were in Mozambique during
this time. [Ref. 76] Economic and technical agreements were
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also signed with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and East
Germany which are in keeping with Machel's policy of strength-
ening alliances with socialist countries.
Relations with the United States have deteriorated over
the years and were at an all time low after four U.S. diplomats
were expelled in 19 81 for being CIA agents. Diplomatic
relations were not broken but what small aid was being given
was terminated.
Mozambique has begun to foster good relations with Great
Britain particularly after the Rhodesian settlement. Mozambique
is still most dependent on the Scandianavian countries for
developmental aid and is attempting to strengthen this relation-
ship.
Mozambique continues to occupy a critical position in
southern Africa because of its geographical location with
regards to South Africa. Raids by South African forces have
continued since Zimbabwe's independence and in some instances
are aimed at sowing instability within Mozambique rather
than against ANC guerillas. This coupled with alleged South
African support for the RNM has placed Mozambique in a very
delicate position. As a result of South African military
buildups near the border the Mozambican army has come under
scrutiny. The army has been increased to some 24,800 men and
new equipment has arrived from the Soviet Union along with
advisors from various socialist countries. Current equipment




50 light tanks (PT-76), 150 armoured cars (BRDM) , 250 armoured
personnel carriers (BTR 40/152) , assorted howitzers (76-152 mm)
;
BM-21 122 mm rockets, mortars, recoilless rifles; Sagger anti-
tank guided weapons; anti-aircraft guns; 24 SAM 6, SA-7 missiles;
9 patrol boats, two squadrons with 36-47 MIG 17/19/21; 4 Alouette
and 10 Mi-8 helicopters; and 13 transport aircraft.
Mozambique despite its Marxist government and its opposition
to the white-minority-regimes of southern Africa is tied
strongly to South Africa by the necessity of economics. Diplo-
matic relations with South Africa is not possible because of
Mozambique's stand against apartheid although commercial
attache's and customs and railroad offices remain in operation.
Relations between the two countries are based on necessity
which has its roots in the pre-colonial economic ties developed
and the hope that hostilities in southern Africa will not
spread to the Mozambique-South Africa border. Mozambique is
destined to be a very important regional player in southern
Africa for some time to come.
C. COMOROS
About halfway between the northern tip of Madagascar and
the East African coast lie the main islands of the Comoros.
The anthropological records of these islands are very scant
although the people appear to be African, but with a signifi-
cant number of Arab features on the northern islands (probably
brought over from the coast) and of Malagasy stock on Mayotte.
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[Ref. 77] The original settlers probably arrived from the
Far East and were of Melano-Polynesian origin but by the 16th
century immigrants from the African coast, Madagascar and
Persia, as well as Arabs had come to the islands. In the
early part of the 16th century the Portuguese, Dutch and
French began to arrive and the islands are still not completely
integrated. Historically, these islands have served as a link
between Madagascar and Africa with Malagasy influence stronger
in the southern islands of Mayotte and Moheli. Although there
are some degrees of ethnic, linguistic and cultural unity the
four islands also have major differences in experience, culture
and tradition that often give rise to interisland dispute.
Most of the population are Moslem with Arabic and Swahili the
principal languages. The French came to Mayotte in 1841 and
began their colonization process. One by one the islands were
ceded to France until in 1912 Les Comores was proclaimed a
colony of France. The islands came under the control of the
Governor of Madagascar and because of their separateness and
cultural differences were largely ignored by the colonial
administration. The traditional social structure on the islands
remained in place and the French merely superimposed on it
and absorbed the ruling clan into the bureaucratic structure.
Whatever development took place was directed for the benefit
of French companies or the administrators. Cash crops were
undertaken for export by the companies while the population
retained their subsistence level existence. During World War
91

II the islands were occupied by the British. Upon the creation
of the French Union in 1946 the Comoros were separated from
Madagascar and in 19 58 they became a French overseas territory.
Complete autonomy was bestowed on the territory and an
elected Chamber of Deputies and Council were established with
the President of the Council of Government being the head of
the territorial government. The Presidency was held by Said
Mohammed Sheikh, a feudal lord, from 1961-19 70 when he was
succeeded upon his death by Prince Said Ibrahim. A High
Commissioner of the French Republic still retained most of
the power and four regiments of French soldiers were stationed
on the islands to do his bidding. In theory any Comoran could
run for office but opposition to the government and France
was closely monitored and suppressed. This caused the formation
of exile movements led from abroad. Most noteworthy of these
was Abdou Boina who formed the Mouvement de Liberation Nationale
des Comores (MOLINACQ) in 196 3 in Dar Es Salaam. On the
islands this group began organizing secret cells and was
particularly strong among youth in the schools. [Ref. 78]
Traditionally there have been two political parties on
the islands - the Comoros Democratic Union (UDC) and the
Comoran People's Democratic Rally (RDPC) often referred to as
the ''greens" and "whites" respectively. The UDC is pro-French
and led by Said Ibrahim and the RDPC is an opposition party
led by Mohamed Jaffar. Until 1972, both parties pledged to
maintain strong ties with France and to secure more French
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aid. The coalition between the two parties was destroyed in
19 72 when Jaffar publicly demanded independence from France
and took over the Presidency of the Council from Ibrahim in
June. By September the UDC had joined in the move toward
independence and the Chamber of Deputies dissolved. In the
election of 19 72, the RDPC , the UDC and the Comoros Progress
Party (PEC) joined to form a "Union" for the independence of
the Comoros which was opposed by Ibrahim's new party, the UMMA
which campaigned for independence only with the agreement of
France. The "Union" easily defeated the opposition on all of
the islands except for Mayotte where 80% were opposed. Ahmed
Abdallah the leader of the UDC became President of the Council.
In June 19 73, an agreement was signed which would give
the Comoros full independence after five years subject to a
referendum to be held at that time. Abdallah was made
President of the Government and France retained control of
foreign affairs, defense and currency, however in December
the Deputies voted for independence by 19 76. The representatives
from the Mayotte People's Movement (MPM) abstained in this
vote and it became evident that Mayotte would become a problem.
Despite the protests of the Mayotte political leader Henry a
referendum was slated for December 1974. The UDC and the
RDPC merged to form the Parti pour 1 ' independance et 1' unite
des Comoros (PUIC)
.
The referendum resulted in a 96 per cent vote in favor
of independence except on Mayotte where 6 4 per cent opposed
93

it. These results led to much political conflict and on 6
July 1975, the Comoran Deputies voted a unilateral declaration
of independence, elected Abdallah as President and called
itself a National Assembly. The French did not intervene but
retained control of Mayotte. Opposition to Abdallah arose in
the form of the United National Front (FNU) which favored a
more peaceful policy towards Mayotte and less personal power
for Abdallah. On 3 August the FNU staged a coup and Abdallah
was overthrown and a National Executive Council formed under
Jaffar and Ali Soilih, who led the coup, became Defence Minister,
The MPM began to expell all non-Mahorais from Mayotte and
on 12 November the Comoros were admitted to the U.N. as a
unified state consisting of the entire island archipelago.
The admission was not opposed by France but France continued
her plans for a separate referendum on Mayotte. Angered by
this the Executive Council nationalized all French adminis-
trative property on the islands and dismissed all French
officials. France formally recognized the independence of
Grande-Comore , Anjouan and Moheli but relations between the
countries ceased. In January 1976, Ali Soilih was elected
Head of State and he set about the task of creating a consti-
tutional system that would hopefully win back Mayotte.
Mayotte held its referendum in February 19 76 and voted
to retain its link with France and through complicated legal
maneuvers it now finds itself a collectivite territoriale or




Outraged by this the Comoros began a very vindictive
campaign to erase all records of French administration. The
civil service was abolished along with various ministries and
the government reorganized. In May 19 77, the Comoros was
proclaimed a "democratic, secular, socialist republic" centered
around a new local administration based on the moudira (small
self-sufficient units comprising a population of about 6,000).
The structure of the revolution blended Maoism and Islam but
was unique in that it created new ruling groups called moudirs
comprised of local chiefs and students. Students and youths
became Soilih's supporters and were given administrative
positions. The voting age was lowered to 14 and the redis-
tribution of land was to take place, however the revolution
found few willing adherents outside of the moudirs . Unfortu-
nately, none of Soilih's reforms brought any semblance of
stability, and his attempts to change traditional religious
life were deeply resented, and only added to the frustrations
experienced by crop failure, drought and food shortage.
On 12 May 19 78, President Soilih was overthrown by a coup
(and subsequently shot and killed) and a new "political-
military directorate" led by President Ahmed Abdallah, who had
been in exile since being deposed in 19 75 by Soilih, took over.
Robert Denard, a French mercenary led the 5 0-man commando unit
that landed to carry out the relatively bloodless coup.
[Ref. 79] African nations were frightened by the coup and
the Comoros delegation was expelled from the OAU. Denard
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served briefly as commander of the Comorian armed forces and
as a member of the directorate but left the islands on 28
September in order to enable the Comoros to regain its right-
ful place in the "concert of nations". [Ref. 80] Diplomatic
relations with France had been re-established after the coup
as had the resumption of French economic and military cooper-
ation. Other countries soon joined in and aid was received
from Arab countries, the EEC and the African Development Fund.
In February 19 79, the Comoros was readmitted to the OAU.
On 1 October 19 78, the electorate voted in favor of the
islands becoming an Islamic Federal Republic and on 22 October
Abdallah was elected President. [Ref. 81] The new republic
comprises a Presidency, a Council of Government, a Federal
Assembly, the Supreme Court and an elected Governor for each
island thereby giving the islands some autonomy.
Abdallah has been trying to clean house since the ouster
of Soilih and rebuild the country. Major links have been
reforged to the Western and Arab worlds from which aid and
technical assistance must come for modernization of the society
A large but still disunited opposition in exile is a serious
concern not only because of the threat to the regime but for
the source of embarrassment it causes to be focused on the
issue of political prisoners. The defection of one of his
ambassadors was a serious blow to the Abdallah government and
a boost to the opposition. In addition to cruel treatment of
his opposition Abdallah has been accused of governing by cor-
rupt means with incompetent officials who are his friends.
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Mayotte still poses a problem to the Comorian adminis-
tration and it must proceed cautiously. French and Western
aid is vital to the economy of the islands and Mayotte has
become a strategic base for the French in the Indian Ocean.
A 19 79 bilateral military agreement between France and the
Comoros has brought the Comoros under the wing of French
military protection. The local army consists of about 1,000
men and French military instructors and soldiers are said to
number about 400.
Regionally, the Comoros has found that its neighbors are
remaining distant. Because of Tanzania's traditional role as
a training ground for revolutionaries and as a haven for
political exiles Abdallah has kept trade and transportation
links to a minimum. Madagascar has refused to resume the
normally close relations it has had with the islands, and the
Seychelles and Mozambique are also playing it cautious.
Abdallah has attempted to strengthen ties with Arab countries
by stressing the island's Arab background and Islamic religion.
This has caused Abdallah to support the Kuwaiti line on
Palestinian and Middle Eastern issues. [Ref. 82]
D. MAURITIUS
Mauritius inherited from its colonial past a series of
political problems. Originally utilized by Arabs and Malays
as a place of shelter it was "discovered" by the Portuguese in
the 16th century. In the 17th century the Dutch attempted to
create settlements on the island. The first permanent settlers
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were French; they claimed the island in 1715, calling it "lie
de France." The name Mauritius comes from the Dutch who had
named it after Prince Maurice. The French brought slaves with
them from Africa and Madagascar to work their sugar plantations
and currently these Creole descendants of mixed African-European
parentage comprise a little over one quarter of the Mauritian
population. Mauritius was captured by the British in 1810 and
it was placed under British rule after the Treaty of Paris in
1814 along with the Seychelles, the Chagos islands and Rodrigues
It remained a British colony for a century-and-half . The
French inhabitants were allowed to keep their language, culture
and legal system. The abolition of slavery in the British
colonies in 1833 forced the planters to turn to India for
indentured laborers and by 1861 it is estimated that two-
thirds of the population was Indian.
The first Council of Government in Mauritius was estab-
lished in 1825 due to demands made by the planter and merchant
elites. Elections were held every five years under strict
franchise laws which are designed to maintain the position
of the elite. The Indians were kept out of the political
system. The island's first political party, the Mauritius
Labor Party, established in 19 36 by a Creole doctor, was
based on the model of the British Labor Party. Rioting
occurred in 19 37 as a result of labor grievances and in 19 45
the constitution was revised. This revision promulgated in
1947 provided for a Legislative Council of elected, nominated
and official members. Suffrage was extended to all over 21
who could prove they could write a sentence in any language.
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The constitutional revision created a dramatic change in
Mauritian politics as the Indian majority was sure to remove
control from the Franco-Mauritians. The results of a general
election in 19 4 8 gave 10 seats in the council to Indians, 7
to Creoles and only 1 to a Franco-Mauritian. The Indian
community continued to build on its power base and an Indian
doctor, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, became the leader of the Labor
Party. The Labor Party maintained an alliance with the Creole
laborers and the Indians. Constitutional changes and a limit
on the power of the government were among the demands champi-
oned by the Labor Party along with the introduction of a
ministerial system. A new constitution in 1959 extended suf-
frage and Mauritius headed steadily towards independence. It
was during this time that two new parties were formed called
the Independent Forward Bloc and the Muslim Committee of
Action (CAM) . The former was a Hindu party with its base in
the rural community while the latter was an attempt to improve
the position of the Muslims. The party of the Franco-Mauritian
and Creole elite initially called the Ralliement Mauricien later
became the Parti Mauricien (PM) and further evolved into its
present form the Parti Mauricien Social Democrate (PMSD) under
Charles Duval. At a conference in London in 1961 it was
decided to approve self-government for the island.
Opposition to the Labor Party and independence was beginning
to mount by those who feared Indian domination. Violence began
to errupt in 1965 and this combined with a break in the political
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alliance between the Labor Party and the PM. The PM favored
an "association" with Britain and was against independence
whereas most of the other parties favored independence and
formed the Independence Party. The end result was that on 12
March 196 8 Mauritius gained its independence and Ramgoolam,
the head of the Labor Party, became the first Prime Minister.
Mauritius is still a member of the British Commonwealth. It
has a parliamentary government which is headed by a Prime
Minister and supported by a Legislative Assembly with a Council
of Ministers and a constitution.
Since independence, opposition to the government from the
Mouvement Militant Mauricienne (MMM) organized under Paul
Berenger, the son of one of the elite Franco-Mauritian planters,
in 1969 has increased. Berenger* s MMM has been able to ally
the youth of Mauritius against the government. Solidifying
himself among the youth he then turned to the organization of
trade unions and by 19 71 he had successfully gained control
of the island's major transport and dock worker unions.
Strikes broke out and a State of Emergency was declared in
1971 and many MMM supporters were arrested. Dissension soon
overtook the MMM and it had small groups split off.
In 19 73, the coalition of Labor and the PM split and
Duval left the government because of a dispute with Prime
Minister Ramgoolam over potential French basing rights in
Mauritius. General elections were held in December 19 76 with
the Independence Party and the PM both campaigning against the
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MMM on the grounds that the latter was communist. The MMM
program called for the formation of a republic with a token
president, a partial nationalization, an anti-South African
stand, and the return of Diego Garcia and Tromelin to Mauritius
The results of this election proved surprising as the MMM
staged an upset in winning 34 seats in parliament as opposed
to 2 7 for the Independence Party, 8 for the PM and 1 for the
CAM. It was only because of Ramgoolam's hasty formation of
a coalition with the PM that Berenger was prevented from
forming a government. This coalition has managed to retain
power but now faces a very crucial test in the upcoming
elections
.
The election scheduled for 11 June 19 82 appears to be a
choice between the currently ruling pro-Western Labor Party
and Social Democratic Party coalition under the control of
Ramgoolam or the socialist MMM and Mauritian Socialist Party
(PSM) coalition under Berenger. [Ref. 83] Caste plays an
important role in Mauritian politics particularly within the
Labor Party where the Hindu's have become extremely caste-
conscious and it may be the determining factor in the
election.
The Labor Party wants to follow a more leftist policy and
has said that capitalism must be eliminated and the basic
principles of democratic socialism need to be reaffirmed. The
party is attempting to mobilize the people and to provide
them information. In foreign affairs the party is encouraging
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disarmament, supporting non-alignment and maintaining good
relations with Indian Ocean countries, reclaiming Diego Garcia,
urging demilitarization in the Indian Ocean, recognizing the
PLO and supporting the New International Economic Order.
The Diego Garcia problem is one of great interest to most
of the people of Mauritius. Ramgoolam has often been accused
of selling out the country in disposing of the island in 1965
while he claims that he had no other choice if Mauritius was
to be granted independence. After making many vigorous de-
mands for the return of Diego Garcia and receiving support
from the OAU, Ramgoolam in November 19 80, addressed the
U.N. demanding the return of the island but in a later inter-
view said that the U.S. should negotiate directly with
Mauritius for the use of the island. [Ref. 84] The MMM
agrees with Ramgoolam on the return of Diego Garcia and both
support the zone of peace concept calling for the removal of
all foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean. The MMM
and Labor see Diego Garcia as an excuse for the Soviets to
increase their military presence in the area but unlike
Berenger, Ramgoolam insists that military withdrawal not be
limited to the U.S. It is anticipated that the status of
Diego Garcia will play a major role in the upcoming election
and in most quarters a Ramgoolam victory is seen as a victory
for the West.
The Ramgoolam government is also under a crossfire on the
issue of South African relations. Mauritius has a strong
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trade link with that nation much to the displeasure of the
MMM while Duval of the PMSD urges a stronger link in the
economic and commercial areas. Consistent with OAU resolutions,
Mauritius has not established diplomatic relations with South
Africa. In an apparent turn, Mauritius did not answer the
roll-call in the U.N. on 7 November 19 80 after a debate on
sanctions against South Africa although on previous occasions
they had given full support. Mauritius has become increasingly
dependent on South Africa in the tourist industry as well as
the sugar and tea export industries while importing more and
more food from South Africa. Another point of contention is
the proposal to build an oil refinery on the island that
supposedly exceeds the requirements of the country and leads
some of the opposition to believe that the excess will be
sold to South Africa. [Ref. 85]
Mauritius has had its share of bloodshed, civil disorders
and enactment of emergency powers throughout its history.
Strikes and riots are common. Ethnocentric communities
remain hostile to this day and sugar still dominates the
economy however foreign affairs which are vital to the islands
trade economy have been misleading. [Ref. 86] Mauritius'
role in international affairs is very complex due to its
geographical position, its economic situation and its close
ties with Britain. Because of its membership in organizations
like the U.N., the Commonwealth, OCAM, the Francophone com-
munity, the EEC, the East African Community and a myriad
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of international associations as well as the OAU Mauritius
has been able to play an important part in international
affairs. Mauritian leaders have at one time or another dealt
with China, India, Egypt, Tanzania, France, Israel, Japan,
South Africa, African liberation movements, the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R.
In late 19 70, the Soviet Union was granted refueling and
docking rights for Soviet fishing vessels as well as landing
rights for Aeroflot planes transporting crews for the vessels.
This agreement to provide trawler facilities at Port Louis
formalized previous relations and specified what the Soviet
vessels could and could not do in return for Soviet fishery
equipment and technical assistance. This agreement set the
stage for an outcry that Mauritius gave the Soviet's strategic
concessions. [Ref. 87] Many feel that the presence of Soviet
trawlers foreshadows that of the fleet. According to Robert
Hanks initially the fishing craft put in to Port Louis for
fuel, rest and supplies, however, the Soviet Navy was not
far behind, and today the Soviet flag is a familiar sight in
and around this strategically located port. [Ref. 88] The
Soviet navy has mooring buoys off the Seychelles, off
Mauritius and in the Chagos Archipelago as well as Socotra;
Port Louis is used for fleet supply purposes. [Ref. 89] It
appears that an MMM victory could play into the Soviet's hands
and lead to a denial of Western naval access to Port Louis,
more pressure for the U.S. to withdraw from Diego Garcia, and
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the development of an anti-Western coalition composed of
Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar in the Western Indian
Ocean. [Ref. 90] The Soviet Union is proceeding cautiously
as it does not desire to alienate the current regime and
jeopardize its current position. This approach does not
prevent them from encouraging Libyan support for the MMM.
The Libyans along with the Seychelles have been funneling
financial assistance to the MMM mainly through an Islamic
Cultural Center established by the Libyans. Despite Qaddaf i '
s
connection with Berenger no one is sure to what extent he will
be able to influence a new government. [Ref. 91] ] Libyan
funding has caused Ramgoolam to depart from his former policy
on the Middle East and relations were broken with Israel, the
Middle East Peace settlement denounced, and the PLO recognized,
The U.S. is in a difficult position because of Diego
Garcia and the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. In an attempt to
provide some financial assistance to the ruling coalition and
offset the Libyan backing of the MMM the U.S. government
decided to hire Mauritian workers for use on Diego Garcia.
Unfortunately U.S. aid has continued to diminish and there is
no developmental assistance funds for Mauritius in 19 82. U.S.
naval vessels frequent he island in an effort to maintain a
U.S. presence in the area and to expand contacts between
American and Mauritian nationals.
Mauritius is another key crossroad in the Indian Ocean
where Soviet and U.S. naval forces are building up because
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of the instability in Iran and Afghanistan [Ref. 92] and the
upcoming election will greatly influence the outcome of
superpower strategy in the area.
E. SEYCHELLES
The uninhabited Seychelles were probably known and fre-
quented by traders from Arabia and the Persian Gulf region
during the Middle Ages long before the first reported
Portuguese sighting in 1502. The exploration of the islands
in 1742 was prompted by the French governor of Mauritius and
France claimed possession in 1756. The islands remained
uninhabited for the next twelve years at which time French
planters imported African slaves in order to undertake the
creation of fruit and copra plantations and to harvest the
available timber. During the Napoleonic Wars French vessels
operated out of the Seychelles harassing English shipping
until the island surrendered to the captain of an English
vessel after a successful blockade in 1794. The adminis-
tration of the island under the French continued until 1810
and the Treaty of Paris signed in 1814 formally ceded the
Seychelles and Mauritius to England.
These two islands became English colonies and were
administered as a single entity by a commissioner appointed
from Mauritius. The islanders were allowed to retain their
French language and customs and this explains the large
French cultural influence found on the islands today. French
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remains one of the islands' official languages the other
being English. Approximately 90 percent of the population is
Roman Catholic. The first steps to separate the two island
colonies were taken in 1872 and in 1888 an order was passed
providing the Seychelles with an Administrator and a nominated
council. By 189 7, the Administrator had attained the powers
of Governor and in 1903, the separation of Mauritius and the
Seychelles was completed and the Seychelles became a Crown
Colony.
French emigration to the Seychelles had continued until
slavery was abolished by the British in 18 33. The inter-
marriage of the predominately French settlers and the now
freed slaves led to the development of a nearly homogenous
Creole society in contrast to that of Mauritius where a larger
number of Indian laborers were imported. Chinese merchants
came to the Seychelles in order to take advantage of the
island's commercial potential but they along with the Indians
are a small minority (about 1% of the total population)
.
Political parties developed in the colony and in 196 3
for the first time elections were undertaken along party
lines. In stark contrast to Mauritius the parties in the
Seychelles were constructed along class lines rather than
ethnic groupings. By 1964, the Seychlles Democratic Party
(SDP) under James Mancham and the Seychelles People's United
Party (SPUP) under France Rene were the predominant actors
on the political scene. Mancham was from a wealthy Chinese
10 7

background and claimed the allegiance of the wealthy island
elite. He advocated free enterprise and a close association
with England and is considered politically right of center.
Rene, a decendent of a white settler on the island, has his
strength in the trade unionists, and intellectuals while
appealing to many of the lower class. Politically he leans
to the left.
In 19 70, the English agreed to a plan to establish a
ministerial system on the islands and opposed a plan by Mancham
for integration with England. By this time the United Nations
was calling for a transfer of power to elected representatives
of the islanders, a closing of the gap between the rich and
the poor, and a system to prevent foreign economic interests
from taking over the area.
The 196 7 elections had given the SDP four seats in the
Legislative Council as opposed to three for the SPUP. The
Council was expanded to 15 members in 19 70 and in the election
of that year the SDP won 10 seats on an integration platform
while the SPUP won five seats on an independence platform.
Mancham became the Chief Minister but the OAU supported the
socialist oriented Rene in his quest for independence. In
19 73, Mancham announced that he would ask for internal self-
government but in a major political shift just prior to the
19 74 elections he campaigned for independence rather than
integration. In the controversial elections of 1974, the
SDP received 5 3% of the popular vote and 13 seats while the
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SPUP polled 4 8% of the votes but only received 2 seats. [Ref.
93] Obviously the SPUP claimed that the election was unfair.
A coalition government was formed in June 19 75 in order to
prepare for independence in 19 76. In order to rectify part
of the discrepancy resulting from the 19 74 election the
Legislative Assembly was increased in size to twenty-five
with each party receiving five additional seats. A Cabinet
of Ministers was formed with eight members from the SDP and
four from the SPUP with Mancham as Prime Minister. The
coalition operated smoothly on the surface but the political
separation between the two parties continued to widen.
The Constitutional Conference of January 19 76 agreed on
independence and a constitution to take effect on 29 June 19 76.
At this time the Legislative Assembly was renamed the National
Assembly, Mancham became the President and Rene the Prime
Minister. It was anticipated that the coalition government
would remain in office until the elections of 19 79. The
islands of Desroches, Farquhar and Aldabra which had been
separated from the Seychelles to form the British Indian
Ocean Territory (BIOT) in 1965 were returned to the Seychelles
at independence.
Just 342 days after achieving independence the Republic
of the Seychelles experienced a coup. While attending a
meeting in London President Mancham was deposed by 60 armed
Rene supporters who allegedly received arms and training in
Tanzania. Rene claimed that he had no prior knowledge of
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the plot however Jacques Hodoul who led the coup became the
Minister of Education and Culture in Rene's new government.
[Ref. 94] Rene became President, suspended the constitution,
dissolved the National Assembly and expelled some English
police officers. Noticing the ease in which Mancham's govern-
ment fell Rene undertook the formation of an army and a
security force to defend his regime. On 2 July 19 78, 18 tons
of small arms were flown to the island by an Air Algerie
transport complete with an Algerian colonel. There were
enough arms in this shipment to provide one out of every four
men on the island with an AK47 Kalashnikov. [Ref. 95] The
fear of a countercoup appears to be well-founded as the
government has reported at least one attempted coup per year
since 19 77. [Ref. 96] Rene ruled the country by decree until
June 19 79 when a new constitution was proclaimed which made
the Seychelles a one-party state. Mancham remained in London
and is banned from returning to the islands. In June 19 78,
the SPUP was renamed the Seychelles People's Progressive
Front (SPPF) and became the only political party on the
islands.
President Rene pledged that his government would be "based
on some system of socialism which we can evolve for the
Seychelles." He has maintained a mixed economy and there
has been no widespread nationalization or appropriation of
land or industry and the tourist industry is still almost
completely in private control. [Ref. 97] The government's
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socialist philosophy has lead to increased opposition by the
small middle class.
Under the June 19 79 Constitution the President is Head-
of-State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and serves
for five years. His successor is nominated by the national
congress of the SPPF and the voters are given a simple choice
of voting yes or no. The President picks his own Ministers
which are then subject to ratification by a People's Assembly.
The Council of Ministers advises the President. The Assembly
has 2 3 elected members representing the Inner Islands and two
appointees of the President representing the Outer Islands.
Rene won the election of 19 79. [Ref. 98] Many changes were
made in the Constitution with regards to strengthening the
position of the SPPF and making it "the vanguard party" of
the socialist revolution. Opposition became so severe over
the proposal for compulsory National Youth Service (NYS) that
schools were closed. The government finally agreed to start
the program on a voluntary basis in 19 81 and the first youth
village opened in that year. According to the government
another coup attempt was foiled in November 19 79 involving
mercenaries from South Africa. Many people were detained and
when they were released quickly left the country. The large
number of politically dissatisifed individuals residing out-
side of the country is of great concern to Rene and Mancham
still poses a viable threat. The latest coup of 25 November
19 81 places further emphasis on this point.
Ill

It was Rene's attention to the formation of the Seychelles
Liberation Army, People's Militia and security forces that
saved his regime in November 19 81. The defense forces are
small with the Army numbering some 900 men in three infantry
companies, the Militia with about 1,500 men, a 550 man police
force and a small naval force. Most of the training has been
done by Tanzanian instructors and the force is equipped with
small arms, armored and light artillery primarily of Soviet
manufacture. [Ref. 99] The Tanzanians were gradually being
withdrawn at the time of the coup but now their number has
been increased to 400. [Ref. 100] After the 1981 coup
attempt, Rene requested French military training for the de-
fense force and French maritime reconaissance of the islands
sea and airspace. The British have also received inquiries
on future arms sales. [Ref. 10]
The Seychelles is a member of the Commonwealth, OCAM and
the OAU. It conducts a foreign policy of "positive non-
alignment" with the superpowers while strengthening its
identification with Africa and other Third World countries.
According to a UN Ambassador, the Seychelles, "minute as they
may be... have a paramount role to play in international affairs
from within our world organization, particularly in the best
interests of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace free from
great power rivalry." [Ref. 102] President Rene is one of
the most staunch advocates of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
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and demilitarization of the BIOT. In a February 19 80 meeting
the SPPF called for the removal of all foreign bases in the
Indian Ocean. Rene is strongly against the U.S. base on Diego
Garcia. Warships of all navies are permitted routine port
visits to the islands as long as they certify that they are
not carrying nuclear weapons. The Seychelles government will
not allow any country to establish base facilities in the
islands.
The Soviet Union has been attempting to cultivate friendly
relations with the Seychelles. Soviet diplomats have begun
a campaign of "ruthless friendship" toward the government in
pursuit of strategic goals to have a base astride the main
tanker route for oil destined to Western Europe and North
America. A Soviet presence in the islands would act as a
counterweight to the establishment of U.S. facilities at
Mombasa Kenya. [Ref. 10 3] Within four days of the attempted
coup in November 19 81 a Soviet cruiser and destroyer anchored
off of Victoria in a show of solidarity and an Alligator-class
vessel arrived a few days later. [Ref. 104] Moscow has no
economic aid program with the Seychelles and commercial trade
is minimal but in October 19 81 it presented a patrol vessel
to the government. An accord also was signed to set up an
astronomy observatory on the islands. [Ref. 10 5] The Soviets
appear to have an advantage in the Seychelles with the largest
diplomatic representation of any nation, a common bond of




Relations with the U.S. is on the increase with a renego-
tiated lease on a U.S. space tracking station that runs until
1990 (the station was originally built in 1963) . The monetary
benefit from the lease of this facility combined with the
money spent by the personnel manning the station is very
important to the economy of the islands. U.S. economic
assistance to the islands has greatly increased in the past
few years and currently totals about $3 million. Assistance
in food crop development and agricultural feeder road con-
struction has been undertaken and there are approximately 15
Peace Corps volunteers in the islands. All U.S. personnel
have made major efforts to cement good relations and improve
the U.S. position in the islands. U.S. interests in the
Seychelles appear to focus on softening the Soviet efforts to
strengthen their relationship with the government and the
prevention of Soviet base facilities in the area.
President Rene has expanded contacts with Third World
countries in an effort to remain independent of the super-
powers. The English and French had provided most of the
financial assistance but they are slowly being replaced by
Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Libya and India as well as a host of
international organizations. To avoid identification with
the Soviet Union the Seychelles has built ties with North
Korea, China and Yugoslavia and has recognized/established
diplomatic relations with the Kampuchea Revolutionary Council
[Ref. 106], the Maldives [Ref. 107], Vietnam, Albania and the
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Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (whose membership in the OAU
Rene strongly supports). [Ref. 108]
Within the Western Indian Ocean region the Seychelles has
often been at odds with Mauritius. This apparently goes back
to the coup in 19 77 when Rene came to power and Ramgoolam
described him and his followers as a "group of gangsters."
The Seychelles are also distressed over the statement that if
Britain returns Diego Garcia to Mauritius the government of
Mauritius would lease it to the U.S. for defensive purposes.
Differences of opinion have also surfaced at the International
Whaling Commission conference where the Seychelles finds
itself opposed by Mauritius, Kenya and Tanzania regarding a
sanctuary for whales. Mauritius has accused the Seychelles
of attempting to destabilize and overthrow the current regime
by financing the Marxist opposition party, MMM, which has
vowed to remove Ramgoolam from power. [Ref. 109] In March
19 81, a Seychelles tuna boat was illegally boarded in Mauritius
by paramilitary commandoes which only served to deteriorate
relations between the two countries. [Ref. 110] In com-
pliance with the OAU and in order to strengthen the country's
African identity, Rene takes a strong stand condemning South
Africa for its policies on Namibia and apartheid. South
African Airlines flights were terminated in 19 80 although
South African tourists still may enter the country on Royal
Swazi Airlines. As a point of interest the mercenaries taking
part in the abortive coup of November 19 81 entered as a
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visiting rugby team on this airline. [Ref. Ill] Rene
frequently focuses his attack on the close commercial ties
between South Africa and Mauritius and recently loaned $3
million to that island country to aid the sagging tea industry.
[Ref. 112] In an effort to retain and forge stronger links
with countries of the Western Indian Ocean the Seychelles have
turned to Madagascar and Tanzania. Beginning in 19 79 Tanzania,
Madagascar and the Seychelles held joint military maneuvers
in the Seychelles including naval forces. Maritime agreements
were signed between the countries. [Ref. 113] Special
relationships have since developed between these countries
which in the case of Tanzania date back to the coup of 19 77.
While it is true that Rene's socialist policies and
rhetoric have antagonized many of the island's populace it
is very difficult to ascertain the true extent of his support.
Many have fled into exile and the resurgence of democracy or
the resurrection of Mancham are distinct possibilities. The
threats inside and outside the country have forced Rene to
increase his security forces and he does not have the




IV. U.S. POLICY IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN
A. OBJECTIVES
The events that have taken place in the WIO and Mozambique
in the 19 70's have drastically altered the economic, political
and military situation in the area and indicate the possibility
of more change in the future. It is clear that this area is
becoming more important to U.S. interests and that the
United States should give it the attention it deserves. As
a bloc, African nations now account for almost a third of the
membership of the United Nations. This formidable voting
power in the U.N. in association with the voting power of
other non-aligned nations in the world, gives the African
states considerable political clout in the international arena.
In this context of Third World politics, we should also real-
ize that this area lying between the South Atlantic and the
Indian Ocean, holds a unique geographical position between
the East and the West. [Ref. 114]
The concern with U.S. interests of a security or stra-
tegic nature in the area is focused almost entirely on the
vulnerability of Western shipping lanes in the 10 and around
the Cape of Good Hope. Thus access by the Soviets to bases
in the area is often viewed with alarm as providing the
Soviets the means to blockade or interdict these routes.
The political turmoil in the area as well as in southern
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Africa has increased concerns about the security of the Cape
Oil Route. It is a common belief among conservatives that
radical regimes coming into power with the aid of the Soviet
Union and other Eastern Bloc countries will be so under the
power of Soviet influence that they will automatically allow
their ports and air facilities to be used as bases for Soviet
operations against the West.
The United State's objectives in the WIO are extremely
complex, diverse and multifaceted. For the purpose of this
paper I will borrow a page from Robert Legvold and break
objectives down into four categories: 1) defensive national
concerns, 2) defensive strategic concerns, 3) offensive
national concerns and 4) offensive strategic concerns.
[Ref. 115]
1. Defensive National Concerns
The United States feels that it has an interest in
the stability and economic development of the countries in
the area and that instability, conflicts between regional
powers, and a major change in the local balance of power
would serve the interests of the Soviet Union or China and
therefore would tilt the world military balance in its dis-
favor. [Ref. 116] In other words, it is in our interest
to maintain the status quo or to change it in favor of




2. Defensive Strategic Concerns
The United States has an interest in maintaining the
freedom of the seas, not only on the high seas but in inter-
national straits or channels as well. While the protection
of the sea lanes and the vital Cape Oil Route is less vital
to the United States than to the Europeans it must be re-
membered that somewhere in the neighborhood of 20 per cent
of world shipping travels through the 10. The core of this
objective is the trade route. Additionally, the U.S. is
concerned with monitoring and coping with Soviet naval move-
ments in the area and averting the expansion of Soviet bases/
facilities in the WIO particularly in or about the trade
route.
Soviet warships in the 10 are suspected of being
there in potential readiness to interdict shipping which is
essential for the transportation of oil and strategic minerals
to Europe and the United States. The narrow waters through
which such shipping has to pass such as the Suez Canal and
the Straits of Hormuz or the Cape of Good Hope are often
mentioned as "choke-points" for these operations. Also the
Soviet 10 squadron is in a position to support "national
liberation movements" or friendly littoral states in the 10
against foreign intervention, i.e. movement of Soviet war-
ships into Mozambican ports after South African air attacks.
Another factor which must be considered is that the Soviet
Navy must be in a position to protect Eastern Bloc merchant-
shipping and fishing fleets which are growing each year.
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3. Offensive National Concerns
This objective centers around the U.S.'s ability to
project political influence, increase economic relations,
and stability in the area by increasing its ties with
countries in the area and wooing them over to the Western
way.
The threat to U.S. "credibility" by Soviet advances
in the area constitutes a significant challenge to U.S.
interests, influence and desires in the area and must be
countered by an aggressive U.S. policy. The communication
of U.S. values is a means of confronting anti-Western ideolo-
gies and it is necessary for the U.S. to put forth its views
of the future and to show the resolve to achieve these goals,
We must restate the need to minimize military competition in




For mainly strategic reasons the U.S. may want to
use the WIO as a patrol area or as a launching area for sub-
marines carrying ballistic missiles. Additionally it must
be remembered that the Soviet Navy has been traditionally
divided into four separate fleets (the Arctic, the Baltic,
the Black Sea and the Pacific) and they must maintain a
positive connection between the three European fleets and
the Pacific Fleet through the Indian Ocean. Large Soviet
combatants are not constructed at Vladivostok but rather in
Europe and must be sent to the Pacific either through the
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Suez Canal or via the Cape route. These sea communications
are very important to the Soviet Union as they represent the
only ice-free sea-route linking the Soviet ports in the Black
and Azov seas with those in the Far East. The U.S. must
maintain a position in the WIO from which it is capable of
monitoring and interdicting Soviet naval movements.
B. OPTIONS
In organizing this section into available policy options
for the United States to pursue in the Western Indian Ocean
certain options presented by Helen Kitchen in Options for
U.S. Policy Toward Africa [Ref. 117] have been modified and
consolidated into four options. The four options are:
1) confrontation/geostrategic 2) do nothing or "no policy"
policy 3) concern for credibility and 4) tempered idealism.
It is not the contention of this paper that the four options
presented are the only ones available but that they are the
most prominent ones. They adequately portray the wide range
of values and positions present in U.S. society.
The order in which the options appear in the text are
not intended to convey any significance as to their credi-
bility or popularity. Each option is merely a way of looking
at the United State's actions in the Western Indian Ocean
based on certain perspectives and premises. As in any area
of foreign policy the boundaries of various options are not
clearly delineated and they tend to overlap and merge.
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1. Confrontation/Geostrategic [Ref. 118]
This option calls for the United States to confront
the Soviets, Chinese or Eastern Bloc wherever they are active
in the WIO utilizing the full gambit of available instruments.
According to this view the Soviet Union is an expansionist
and opportunist minded power that will use whatever force is
necessary to gain influence in the WIO including military,
political and economic leverage. Any Soviet or Communist
gain is perceived as a U.S. loss, and the U.S. must mobilize
to meet/counter the threat.
In the words of Eugene Rostow, "The notion that Soviet-
American relations have improved in recent years, that the
cold war is over, that negotiations have been substituted
for confrontation" is a "figment of President Nixon's
political imagination" carried forward by his successors.
The fact is that the cold war is not over and that current
Soviet thrusts are worse than before. What is occurring in
the WIO and in Africa is part of an integral struggle on the
part of the Soviets for worldwide expansion.
One of the major premises of this option is that the
spirit of competition is a permanent feature between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Due to a myriad of
reasons the current arena of competition has shifted to the
Third World and the WIO is now considered within the sphere
of operations in the Soviet Union's campaign to extend its
influence into areas of the world that have been historically
within the Western sphere of influence.
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The main goals of the Soviet Union are perceived to
be the following: to prevent China from expanding its
influence in the world; to establish relationships with
countries that would eliminate/reduce the current logistical
problems encountered by the Soviets in maintaining a "blue
water navy" in the WIO; to establish the right for the Soviet
Union to participate on an equal basis with the United States
on any deliberations (political, economic or military)
affecting the area; and to undermine Western influence when-
ever and wherever the opportunity presents itself.
A United States WIO policy constructed with the above
goals in mind would include: primary attention to U.S./
Western strategic interests (elimination of the capability
of the Soviets to disrupt sea lanes) ; recognition of the
fact that the United Nations often does not act in our best
interest and it is time that we gave up trying to placate
the U.N. ; reaffirmation of the policy that the U.S. military
presence in the 10 is perfectly legitimate and in keeping
with the principal of freedom of navigation on the high seas;
a statement that external intervention in the area should be
opposed; and a clause that requests for external assistance
from countries with historical connections to the area would
be considered in a less antagonistic light than requests or
offers of help from outsiders.
To undertake such a strategy of confrontation would
involve a high level of material and political commitment by
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the United States. A major material and diplomatic outlay
is a vital necessity to the success of this policy. Military
and economic aid would have to be greatly increased and
broadened.
Proponents of this policy would advocate aggressive
development and confrontation with the Soviet Union in the
area. Soviet intervention in the area would be publicly
condemned and the U.S. would have to emphasize that it is
willing to assist any country in the area should they feel
threatened by the Soviet Union or her proxy. Any or all of
the tools available to the United States could be utilized
to maintain stability.
2. Do Nothing or "No Policy" Policy [Ref. 119]
It is not beyond the realm of comprehension to
consider a policy of "no policy" toward the WIO. Criticism
of U.S. interventionism and political pressure might become
so intense that the current administration or the adminis-
tration in control could possibly feel that in their judgement
the national interest at stake in the WIO is not sufficient
enough to warrant the political, economic or military
maneuvers that would be involved in a relationship in the
area.
A "no policy" policy appeals to many different
groups along the American political spectrum. Foremost among
these would be those in the academic community who are to
the left of the center and opposed to virtually almost any
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activity of the United States government or multinational
corporations based in the United States in any area of the
world. This group opposes what they perceive to be the
United States government's purpose in the area. Some advo-
cates of disengagement rely on the vision that the area
itself will seize the initiative in eliminating all external
powers (i.e. the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace). The area should
close itself off from the outside world and allow its own
intra-area forces to run their course. Whether the area
comes out socialist, capitalist, or democratic is not
important but what is important is that it works out the
problem for itself. Others of the "no policy" persuasion
have reached the conclusion that the WIO area is so weak,
unstable and unreliable that the United States should refrain
from interfering or helping the area shape its destiny.
An administration choosing this course of action
would have to have determined that the WIO is of no strategic
importance and that the internal political affairs of the
area are not of enough concern for the United States to
warrant the United States seeking involvement in the area.
The objectives of the "no policy" policy would be
to disassociate the United States from any responsibility
for how the area works out its political destiny and to
remove the threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union in




The unique feature of this option is that there would
be no binding relationships with any of the countries. There
would be no attempts to build up or destroy governments, no
pressure to outmaneuver the Cubans or Chinese or Soviets , and
no strong arming of allies to do our bidding in the area. We
would completely disenfranchise ourselves from the area, re-
lying on the hope that our vastly superior system of economy
and society will eventually inspire emulation by the other
nations of the world.
No U.S. government intervention in political affairs
of the area would be tolerated and the only acceptable form
of intervention would be for strictly humanitarian matters.
The implementation of this policy would mean an overall
reduction in the American profile in the area. Military
planners would not base any of their plans on the present or
future access to ports or airfields in the WIO and any
bilateral aid would cease.
One of the disadvantages of this policy depends upon
the value attached to being a superpower. Can the United
States as a superpower ignore this area or for that matter
any area or would it be an abdication of the responsibility
of a superpower? Another danger is that in effect we are
sending a message to an area of the world and telling them
that they don't count for anything so we'd rather have nothing
to do with them. This could have profound repercussions in
the future in this area and in other areas of the world where
stature would be diminished considerably.
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3. Concern for Credibility [Ref. 120]
The proponents of this option would advocate a prag-
matic and activist stand based on a fine blend of United
States global and regional interests. The WTO would be
viewed as an integral part of the global system. The area
would be recognized as an area of growing interest for the
United States and the West. The areas new role as an arena
for superpower competition and conflict as well as its
strategic location in relation to the Middle East and the
Cape Oil Route is of increasing importance.
The primary objectives of this option would be to
help the countries of the area to achieve a level of stability,
secure vital sea lines of communication for use by the West,
to respond to concerns about the loss of U.S. resolve after
Vietnam and the resulting aimless responses to Soviet chal-
lenges in the area, and to make it absolutely clear that
noninvolvement of a Western power is not the route to counter
the threat to the area.
In order to carry out this policy, one would have to
include active diplomacy at all levels (not just talks and
visits), diplomatic initiatives, economic and military aid
on a much greater scale than at present, positive governmental
incentives, and the possibility of military intervention
cannot be ruled out but rather must be utilized as a viable
source of action. An attempt must be undertaken to portray
the Soviet aims and methods for what they really are and to
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emphasize their military nature. Bilateral economic and
development aid would be greatly expanded without overbearing
conditions being placed on the countries receiving/requesting
the aid. Military aid and sales would increase and the U.S.
would not back away from providing military assistance when
requested by a friendly state.
4. Tempered Idealism [Ref. 121]
This option emphasizes diplomatic skill rather than
strategic means. The primary objective is to minimize con-
flict and violence in whatever changes take place by reducing
the external military component. Patience and negotiations
are the watchwords for this policy.
Among the priorities of this option are an emphasis
on continued negotiations to resolve differences rather than
resorting to force to determine the outcome. Other priorities
include convincing the countries of the WIO that increased
political and economic cooperation with the United States
and the West are in their best interest as well as ours;
that a reduction in the flow of arms into the area will
increase stability; that the countries of the area should
seek regional solutions to regional problems and they should
not call upon external powers to exert influence in the area;
regional institutions should be created or strengthened to
provide for economic development and the peaceful arbitration
of local disputes. The United States role in the area would
be merely supportive and not aggressive.
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The chief assets for implementing this policy are a
very patient diplomacy, which is characterized by an endless
ability to prolong the discussion process; a joint United
States and Western/WIO approach to the problems of the area;
and a reassessment of economic and military assistance to
the area.
While some proponents of this option are thinking along
the lines of a Marshall Plan in order to meet the development
needs of the area this view is tempered by recognition of
the fact that any economic aid likely to be distributed by
Congress would not significantly reduce the basic economic
problems in the WIO area. Multilateral not unilateral
economic aid is the solution to the economic problems pri-
marily through the World Bank and other international agencies.
U.S. and other Western aid must focus on key areas which
should include infrastructure development, education, manage-
ment training programs, industrial/technological development,
and increased agricultural efficiency.
U.S. security assistance would be limited; and
judicious restrictions will be placed on the type of equip-
ments transferred as well as the amounts and recipient
countries. Whenever possible the countries of the WIO will
be urged to seek Western European sources rather than U.S.
sources.
Under this policy, the U.S. would continue to place
emphasis on initiatives by regional actors to resolve
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regional disputes through peaceful means. However it would
still be possible for the U.S. to endorse/support Western or
Arab military action in a crisis if such assistance were
requested by a country. Every effort would be made to reduce
Soviet or Eastern Bloc presence.
To borrow a few lines from Cyrus Vance "our best course
is to help resolve the problems which create opportunities for
external intervention. . .our policies must reflect our national
values. Our deep belief in human rights - political, economic,
and social. .. this means concern for individuals whose rights
are threatened. .. and finally we will seek openness in our
dealings..." [Ref. 122]
One of the basic flaws in this policy is the uncertainty
of how one would deal with the Soviets or Eastern Bloc if
arms deliveries are stepped up by them, or if additional
advisors are provided in crisis situations, or if they
increase their efforts to undermine Western presence and
influence in the WIO.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
After attempting to delineate U.S. interests in the
Western Indian Ocean from strategic, economic and political
points of view the objectives and options available to the
U.S. must be added to the equation. It has become quite
apparent that the area of the Western 10 played a minor role
in U.S. strategic thinking in the past and that the United
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States never considered itself a power in the area. This in
part seems to stem from the fact that NATO allies were
prominent in the area and there was no need to increase the
U.S. presence. Since 1970 this feeling of the 10 being
secure and in "friendly" hands has been forced to give way
in the face of European withdrawals and Soviet incursions.
The United States has a great deal of difficulty in
deciding how to evaluate and react to Soviet activity in the
area of the Western 10. There is continuing conflict among
U.S. policy makers particularly between those who view Soviet
activity in the light of East-West competition and others
who view it within a broader context. The U.S. does not
have interests in the Western 10 that are so vital that
their loss would seriously impact on the survival of the U.S.
It does not appear that the U.S. has a consistent policy
toward the area either militarily, economically or politically
No longer can the U.S. rely on the Western European nations
to carry the burden in the area and the U.S. must construct
a comprehensive policy for the area. This policy must
maximize U.S. strengths while minimizing the possibility of
armed confrontation with the Soviets in the area.
While there is a valid case for seeking U.S. political,
economic and military leverage in states which have per-
ceived strategic importance to the U.S. and her western
allies it should be a balanced approach rather than a lop-
sided one emphasizing only one facet. This approach should
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not single out a specific country but rather must look at
the area in a regional and global perspective. It is self-
defeating to target an individual country in an area as the
"most important" and then to watch that country succumb to
either external or internal forces (i.e. Iran)
.
An Indian Ocean policy should be an affirmative rather
than a reactive approach to the area and its problems. The
downplaying of U.S. -Soviet competition and an increased
emphasis on the importance of Third World economic development
and nationalism should provide a viable form of interaction
in the area. If an integrated approach is taken along these
lines it will prove to be far more effective than one that
is fragmented, random and lacking in coordination.
U.S. investment, trade and business enterprises in the
area of the Western 10 should be encouraged and sponsored
by the U.S. government. The aim of these activities should
not be exploitation of resources or the securing of strategic
facilities but rather the development of an economic relation-
ship between the U.S. and the countries of the region. The
Eastern Bloc has demonstrated time and again that it cannot
provide the sustained economic needs of its client states.
The Eastern Bloc lacks the leverage of a large volume of
overseas trade and investment. The Soviet Union allocates
only minimal resources for economic aid and it does not appear
to be consistent with its ideology to dispense financial
aid to maintain governments in power. The Soviets have a
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distinct advantage in wartime as they are willing to provide
arms to liberation movements but in peacetime the West gains
the upper hand as it has the technology and finances that are
required to build countries.
U.S. economic aid to the countries of the Western 10 should
be on a scale comparable to that provided to other poor and
less developed areas of the world. A number of countries in
this area are among the poorest in the world. The assistance
provided by Western allies and by the Arab nations of the
world should be taken into account but they must not be the
sole suppliers and the U.S. must supply a proportionate share
and maintain an interest in the area.
Most Third World governments are socialistically inclined
and/or have authoritarian regimes. Widespread poverty and
the fragility of political systems coupled with anti-imperial
and anti-colonial sentiments toward the West and its capital-
istic system play right into the socialist's hands. The
recent experiences with colonialism in the Western 10
conditions many of the country's attitudes toward the U.S.
The values and the culture of the West need to be re-
emphasized in the area to counteract the appeal of socialist
ideology. The rights and freedoms of the West need to be
stressed as well as the prosperity of the U.S. along with
its skills and expertise. The development of democratic
political systems should not be the primary goal of U.S.
policy nor should it be a prerequisite for aid. If the U.S.
133

refuses to aid countries because they are Marxist or socialist,
what options do these countries have except to turn to the
East? The very poverty and lack of bureaucratic structure in
most countries works against the success of a socialist govern-
ment unless massive external aid is readily available. It
may very well be that the move to the left represents a
throwing off of cultural and economic dependency on the West
in the quest for national independence and Third World identity.
[Ref. 12 3] We would do well to remember what an American
official at the United Nations said when he cautioned, "that
ideology is by no means the controlling factor in African
politics. . .Tribal rivalries, economic development, nationalism
are all more important than East-West ideology." [Ref. 124]
The key to U.S. policy will be the ability to work with
political regimes of different persuasions in concerted diplo-
matic efforts to solve the regional problems of the area
whether they be over territorial limits, disputed island
claims or the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. The effectiveness
of U.S. diplomacy will depend on how well the U.S. is able
to deal with the various country players in the area
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